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Alumni - Hello Again 
The Barrister members hope you 
enjoyed the last edition - and enjoy 
this one, too! This edition has many 
topical issues written by faculty and 
students. We again ask alumni to 
considersubmittingarticlesforpub-
lication or 'republication.' 
Unfortunately, your Alumni 
Board of Directors voted not to 
allow The Barrister to 'piggy-back' 
with routine alumni mailings - even 
though there would be no addi­
tional costs incurred by the alumni 
association. As such, The Barrister 
had to obtain its own bulk rate per­
mit and then pay the postage to send 
each alumni their copy. 
So we ask that you seriously con­
sider an ad in The Barrister and/or 
make a tax-deductible donat ion to 
the non-profit The Barrister. Our 
address is: 
The Barrister - Editor 
c/o NCCU - School of Law 
1801 Fayetteville Street 
Durham, NC 27707 
Celebration of a 
Pioneer 
Last November the Student Bar 
Association held a celebration for 
Dean Emeritus Daniel G. Sampson. 
Members of the administration, fac­
ulty, student body -both present and 
former, and friends paid tribute to 
this uniquely gifted legal scholar, 
law administrator, professor, and 
human being. A complete account­
ing of The Celebration has been in­
cluded in this edition of The Barris­
ter. 
(Continued on page 2) 
Statutory 
Interpellations 
The Law School Administration 
was non-responsive to the ABA ar­
ticle in the last edition of The Barris­
ter and students sent a petition for 
the ABA to look into the school's 
apparent violation of ABA Stan­
dards. For an update - see pg. 9. 
TRIBUTE TO GREATNESS: THURGOOD MARSHALL 
1908-1993 
The October 1992 Fordham Inw Review1 was a 
composite of the original tribute to Justice Thurgood 
Marshall, sponsored by Fordham Law School and the 
Stein Institute O/IMW and Ethics, in March 1992. The 
March 1992 program was titled "Brown v. Board of 
Education and its Legacy" and had a host of acclaimed 
jurists, scholars, and civil rights litigators, who made 
oral presentations citing the depth andbreadth of Brown-2 
Those March 1992 presentations were revamped for 
the Fordham October 1992 publication and now The 
Barristeris providing a brief overview from that publica­
tion. Hopefully, The Barrister's offering will not only underscore the greatness of the man - but also "wet 
your appetite'and move you to peruse the complete series offered in the October 1992 publication.3 
(Continued on page 4) 
CHANCELLOR CHAMBERS: UPDATE 
Unfortunately, we , the la w st udents o f No rth C arolina C entral Un iversity, have t o sa y "w elcome ab oard" to C hancellor 
Chambers i n t his pu blication, r ather th an in person. Although numerous at tempts w ere made to h ave Chancellor C hambers 
respond to a rather brief qu estionnaire sent at his request, and r epeated attempts to schedule a meeting to discuss law students' 
concerns, Chancellor Chambers' busy schedule has prevented any dialogue. An other attempt to meet has been scheduled for early 
March (after this edition w ent 'to press'). 
Even though students have not 'seen' the Chancellor at the Law School, his presence is being felt. As many of y ou know, by 
way of re ading the Law School Weekly, the Chancellor has appointed a 'blue-ribbon' advisory committee to review "the overall 
reaction of the Law School." In a n attempt to determine the scope of the committee; when and if the committee will meet with 
students; why there aren't 'recent' alumni on the committee; why there are no 3L's on the committee - we met with the chairperson 
- Professor Daye of the UNC-CH School of L aw. The following p araphrases the issues discussed at t hat meeting: 
Q: What is the scope of the Committee? 
A: We have been asked by Chancellor Chambers to advise him about certain law aspects - such as; the administration; faculty; 
curriculum; school's mission. Fu rther, the goal of the Committee is to be in a position to determine facts and present salient 
information and data which will enable the Chancellor to effect the initiatives he wished to employ at the School of Law. 
Q: Will students be able to meet w ith the Committee? 
A: Yes -1 just spoke to the Dean today and she will have sign-up sheets posted for law students. Further, the Committee will 
not be looking at areas that are within the jurisdiction of the faculty of a dministration - n amely, w e w ill not a ttempt t o 
ascertain whether or not the C-rule is 'valid'; we will not deal w ith whether having a required attendance policy is 'proper' 
- because w e are not in a position to evaluate the information and data after a one-day visit. Ag ain, the scope of our mission 
is to provide data and information to the Chancellor; we are not evaluating the data. 
Q: Does that mean the Committee would not pass on information about student concerns regarding these matters: 
A: No - i f w e had n umerous complaints about a ny on e area th en w e w ould p ass th at d ata along to t he Chancellor. M ore 
importantly, the Chancellor is lo oking for t hings th at will as sist him in getting m ore State and F ederal f unds. So, for 
example, if students report that having to work 10-20 hours a week meant they were unable to effectively do their course 
work - t hat w ould b e helpful t o the Chancellor. Again, th at is n ot to say t he Committee or the Chancellor w ill ign ore 
complaints. So , I h ope to see you, and the editor of the Law Journal, SBA representatives, members of o ther NCCU law 
school organizations, any student who signs up to meet w ith us, faculty and administration on M arch 5,1993. 
By: WJO 
(Editor's Note: On March 2, Chancellor Chambers met with The Barrister reporter L. Wells and this editor. - Too late for this edition.) 
(Continued on page 2) 
CELEBRATION OF A PIONEER 
Honorable, dedicated, knowledgeable, philo­
sophical, poetic and learned are only a few of the 
adjectives which are used to describe our own 
Dean andProfessorEmeritus DanielG. Sampson. 
Because Dean Sampson has exhibited the high­
est degree of dedication and concern for the 
students, the Student Bar Association sponsored 
an appreciation celebration; not only to show our 
Dean Sampson honored at S£.A. 
celebration during Homecoming 1992. 
appreciation and express our affection for Dean 
Sampson, but also to give all students a sense of 
this fine human being. 
The appreciation celebration was held the 
evening of November 5,1992 at the law schooL 
Students and faculty were instrumental in mak­
ing the celebration a great success. The master of 
ceremonies was 2L vice president Doug Simon. 
VersheniaBallance, lLclasspresident, presented 
the w elcome. Dean Mary Wright read Dean 
Sampson's biographical sketch. ChristaTidwell, 
3L president, introduced the guest speakers. On 
the roster of speakers were past and present 
students as well as friends of Dean Sampson: 
Attorney Victor Boone, Executive Director of 
East Central Community Legal Services; Mrs. 
LeMarquis DeJarmon, wife of the late law school 
Dean LeMarquis DeJarmon and past president of 
theNational Barrister's Wives; Attorney Allyson 
Duncan, North CarolinaUtilities Commissioner, 
Charles Hines, 3L; and William Olynick, 3L. 
Jerry Smith, 3L, rendered musical selections 
before and after the program. Stephanie Hand, 
3L, serenaded Dean Sampson with an appropri­
ate song entitled, "You are My Hero". As a 
memento of the celebration, the Student Bar 
Association and Phi Alpha Delta law fraternity 
presented Dean Sampson with p laques for out-
standingservicetothelawschool. Thiswonderful 
occasion was brought to a close with a reception 
in the law school lobby. Stephanie Hand and 
Lalita Wells (both 3Ls) catered the reception. 
During the ceremony, it was noted that Dean 
Sampson became a member of our law school 
family in 1950. He served as Dean from 1965 
until 1969. Under his administration, th e law 
school's first legal fraternity was started (Phi 
Alpha Delta); the JD degree replaced the LLB; 
the Law Journal was started; and The Banister 
was started.1 In 1969, Dean Sampson was ap­
pointed legal assistant to Dr. A.N. Whiting, the 
fourth president of North Carolina Central Uni­
versity.2 
Speakers also noted their personal and close 
relationships with Dean Sampson. One spoke of 
a Central law student who was not able to return 
for academic reasons and that Dean Sampson 
"vouched" for the student—thereby providing 
the caliber of recommendation necessary for the 
student to be able to enter another law school. 
Another speaker spoke of Dean Sampson's un­
ending and continued assistance; he had worked 
with her each and every day of the summer for 
countless hours, so that she would be better 
equipped to pass the bar exam. Yet another spoke 
about his seemingly, unending wealth of knowl­
edge —not just legal knowledge, but knowledge 
about life and his capacity to share his vast wealth 
of that knowledge, without superimposing his 
own beliefs and ideas as fret. Occasionally, he 
would share his concerns and questions with the 
understanding it was pure dicta. A former student 
told a story that underscores t he strength and 
humor of this gentle person. During a criminal 
law class, Dean Sampson was questioning this 
S.B.A. V.P. & Pres. Tonya Roberts & 
Teresa Walker "join in" celebration. 
person about the facts of a particular case. De­
scribing the facts, this person remarked that it 
appeared the defendant might have robbed the 
plaintiff's house; asked again, the person re­
peated his remarks, whereupon Dean Sampson, 
chuckling and without any attempt to belittle the 
person,said: "youcannotrobahouse-buiglarize 
perhaps, butnotrob." Another speaker reminded 
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the audience that all students and faculty as well, 
should take advantage of this uniquely gifted and 
inspired person. She reminded us that Dean 
Sampson has taught virtually all the courses at 
Central's law school- from agency to torts (and 
everything in between - except Tax- it was of­
fered that to teach tax you need someone unique 
and Professor Sampson suggested h e was not 
THAT unique). During a moment reserved for 
reflections from the audience, Professor T.M. 
Ringer addedabitofhumorto the celebration. In 
his cross examination persona, Professor Ringer 
relentlessly questioned Dean Sampson about his 
days as an undergraduate at Morehouse College. 
Dean Ringer inquired into the occasion where 
Friends, colleagues, and students listening 
to the tributes to Dean Emeritus Sampson. 
Dean Sampson was given to keep an eye on his 
roommate's girlfriend. Dean Sampson kept a 
very good eye on his roommates' girl - they fell in 
love and he later married his roommate's ex-
girlfriend. From that union three children were 
bom. Two of their children are practicing law­
yers and one is a practicing doctor. 
Many students are not aware that in 1965 Gov­
ernor Dan Moore tried to close the law school 
believing it was not cost effective. It was Dean 
Sampson who developed "The Sampson Paper" 
which documented the detrimental impact the 
closing of the law school w ould have on the 
surrounding community. Dean Sampson's po­
sition was finally accepted and the law school 
survived Governor Moore's attack.2 For the last 
forty-two years, Dean Sampson has been instru­
mental in shaping the Central law studentinto the 
bestlawyersheorhecan become. Dean Sampson 
has had an impact upon more African-American 
attorneys in the Southeast than any other profes­
sor.4 He is everything a law professor should be 
to any aspiring lawyer. He is always concerned 
about students' understanding of the law. He is 
always patient, and he always expresses his 
passion for fairness in the law. 
Students are encouraged to take the courses he 
(Continued on page 3) 
Celebration Of A Pioneer 
(Continued from page 2) 
teaches (debtor/creditor and advance torts). My 
experience as a law strident has been deeply 
enhanced by having had Dean Sampson as a 
teacher, as a guide. Iwouldsuggestthateachand 
every student consider taking a course with this 
truly remarkable person. 
By: Ton ja Roberts 
ENDNOTES 
1. North Carolina Central University School of Law. 
Biographical Sketch of Dean and Professor Emeritus 
Darnel G. Sampson. 
2. Id. 
3. Id 
4. "Moving to New Horizons", volume 3, August 1984. 
Journey With A 
"Guide" 
This is an edited offering of a recently published 
article from a former "The Barrister" publication, 
to give you a further sense of this dynamic 
individual. 
After I had arranged my structural scheme 
and was capable of discarding many data 
that were superfluous to my initial effort cf 
uncovering the cogency of his teachings, it 
became clear to me that they had an 
internal cohesion, a bgical sequence that 
enabled me to view the entire phenomenon 
in a light that dispelled the sense of bi-
zarreness which has the mark of all 1 had 
experienced. It was obvious to me then 
that my apprenticeship had been only the 
beginning of a very long road. And the 
strenuous experiences I had undergone, 
which were so overwhelming to me, were 
but a small fragment of a system of bgical 
thoughtjromwhichDonJuandrewmean-
ingful inferences for his day-to-day Ife, a 
vastly complex system of beliefs in which 
injury was an experience leading to exul­
tation.' 
How exhilarating it would be to have a profes­
sor who not only thoroughly analyzes questions 
and discussed the law, but one who truly enjoyed 
"guiding" students through the many quagmires 
encountered while seeking legal knowledge.... 
Perhaps we have such a person, such a "guide." 
Such a "guide" would have us journey through, 
and then beyond the texts, hornbooks, restate­
ments, and treatises, all of which are known 
virtually verbatim by the "guide." He would be 
able to summarize a questionable statute or court 
decision by simply noting that, there is a point 
beyond which even justice becomes unjust.2... 
Perhaps we have such a person, such a guide. 
Visitors to our university, strolling in our hall­
ways might happen to overhear dialogue or 
interchange between student and such a person, 
such a "guide." The visitors might look quizzi­
cally towards the classroom, and momentarily 
pause to reassure themselves that they are in the 
right building - for they might have just heard the 
"guide" saying in a whisper, to a hushed audience 
of students straining to hear his every word, after 
not having been able to answer, to his own 
satisfaction, a query pertaining to a precept of 
law: 
Fbwer in the crannied wall, 
I p luck you out of the crannies;-
I hold you here, root and all, in my hand, 
Little flower - but fI could understand 
What you are, root and all, and all in all, 
I should know what God and man is.3 
The "guide" would explain that no one knows 
everything about any one thing and when man 
ascertains all knowledge about any one thing, 
then man has become one with his or her 
God..Perhaps we have such a person, such a 
"guide." Another visitor, at another time, may 
have heard the "guide," after asking for volun­
teers to "assist" him in attempting to unlock the 
mysteries of a particularly difficult, seemingly 
unfathomable statute, and getting no response 
simply say, A man should never be shamed to 
own he has been in the wrong, which is but say, 
inotherwords, that he is wiser today than he was 
yesterdaf... Perhaps we havesuchaperson, such 
a "guide." 
If we did have such a person, such a "guide". 
He would have been considered by many to have 
been the Promethean spark, the keystone for 
North Carolina Central University School of 
Law with his vigorous defense, in 1965, against 
Governor Moore's proposal to close the law 
school. His research would have led the "Papa-" 
which assisted in the defeat of Governor Moore's 
desire to close the law school because the school 
was supposedly not cost effective. One would 
onlyobtainbutaglimmerofthis "guide's" mindset, 
by reviewing but a portion of his 1965 prophetic 
statement: 
More and more law schools are limiting 
their enrollmenttothetopfiveortenpercent 
ofcollegegradua&ngclasses. Consequently, 
the student graduating in the bwer, upper, 
or middle part of his classfrom any college 
is finding his source of obtaining a legal 
education diminishing. Because of this 
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factor, North Carolina College Law School 
is in a unique position of performing an 
invaluable service to worthy and deserving 
students as well as contributing to the gen­
eral welfare of the State. 
Dean Emeritus Daniel Sampson has been our 
guide. He obtained his B.S. and M.A. degrees 
before serving in the Army during World War II. 
He then obtained his LL.B. andLLM. atBoston 
College and joined the faculty in 1950, at what is 
now known as North Carolina Central University 
School of Law; and he has been with us ever 
since. He would become the Dean of this Law 
School from 1965 to 1969 and be largely respon­
sible for admitting native American and white 
students, thereby integrating the studen t body. 
He was instrumental in getting the degree classi­
fication, bestowed upon law school graduates, 
changed from LL.B. to aLD.5. In 1969, he was 
asked to serve as the Legal Advisor to the Univer­
sity President and also served on numerous com­
mittees and became Chairman of the Law Dean 
Search Committee in 1980. 
This man, this "guide" is not one to rest on his 
many laurels. Since retiring in 1984, he has been 
an adjunct professor and the "guide" for Ad­
vanced Torts and Debtor/Creditor law. He was a 
member of the 1985 Law Dean Search Commit­
tee.6 
Our "guide" is a man who was described in 
1971 as a person who never had students wh o 
were uncomfortable in his presence and, his 
understanding of students' problems forges a 
strong link which is inseverable! 
Nothing has changed. Our "guide" continues to 
agonize whenever a student has a poor perfor­
mance, thinking that he somehow failed in his 
responsibilities as "guide," rather than placing the 
blame upon the student for not being prepared. 
Our "guide" will not allow a student the false 
luxury of suggesting any outcome, in the law, is 
certain. He would be inclined to say, Certainly 
generally is illusbn, and repose is not the destiny 
of man!1 
Try not to pass up die "journey," the inquiry, 
the experience, which could lead to exhilaration, 
with this wise and uniquely qualified "guide." 
You will sense his wisdom, you will feel it and 
turn your mind towards it, just as you would turn 
yourfacetowardsanearlysummersun. You will 
enjoy the self-deprivating h umor and come to 
"know" the clarity and the wisdom which ema­
nates from this "guide." The most manifest sign 
of wisdom is a continued cheerfulness-, her 
state is like that of things in the regions, above 
the moon, always clear and serene.9 Bask in 
this "guide's good humor and serenity. 
Tennyson said, Knowledge comes but wisdom 
lingers!" The hope is that this wise "guide" 
(Continued on page 4) 
Journey With A "Guide" 
(Continued from page 3) 
lingers with us for many a year, and "guides" 
many a student through some of the seemingly 
overwhelming, complex legal disciplines, allow­
ing them to see how the strenuous mental expe­
riences of trying to understand cases, reveling in 
the poetic beauty of the writings of Cardoza, 
I find, etal, will buildasystemoflogical thoughts. 
Then perhaps, more of us would be in a 
position to say, thou wert my guide, phibsopher, 
and friendP 
By: A grateful traveler: WJO 
ENDNOTES 
1 Carlos Castanet!;!, The teachings of Don Juan: 
A yoqui way of knowledge, 254,255 
(Ballantine Books 1971) (1968). 
3 Sophacles :Electra 
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I Anne Duncan, quoted in Id. 
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Tribute To Greatness: 
Thurgood Marshall 
(continued from page 1) 
The October 1992 issue of the Fordham Law 
Review presented Fordham Law School's tribute 
to one of the giants of American Law and Ameri­
can history on the occasion of his retirement from 
the Supreme Court William MTreanor, Associ­
ate Professor of Law at Fordham Law School 
noted: 
Justice Thurgood Marshall is, I believe, 
the single most important lawyer of this 
century, both for his contribution as an 
advocate and for his contributbn as a jurist 
...The United States today is a remarkably 
different place than it was in 1933 when he 
began practice, and ours is far more just 
society. 
Justbe Thurgood Marshall made history 
repeatedly - as Chief Counsel oftheNAACP 
LegalDefense Fund,as Judge cfthe United 
States Supreme Court cf Appears for the 
Second Circuit, as Solicitor General, and, 
of course, as Supreme Court Justice. But 
perhaps his most important contributbn 
was his victory in the case of Brown v. Board 
of Education? 
Brown was the capstone of Justice Marshall's 
campaign at the NAACP Legal Defense Fund to 
combat a nd eradicate stale-sponsored segrega-
tioa There were, of course, two Supreme Court 
decision in Brown. In the first decision, in 1954, 
Chief Justice Warren, on behalf of a unanimous 
Court, rules that "(separate educational facilities 
are inherently unequal."5 The following year, in 
Brown II, the Court rejected Marshall's request to 
fix a date for the end to segregation,6 it unani­
mously directed the district courts to admit (the 
parties) to public schools on a racially nondis­
criminatory basis with all del iberate speed."7 
Together, the decision in Brown were, at the 
same lime, both revolutionary and conservative. 
They were revolutionary because they dramati­
cally changed the law and the life of the people in 
this country; yet, they were conservative because 
that change was effected by the actions of lawfully 
constituted authority. 
Perhaps the most famous critique of the juris­
prudence of is Professor HerbCTt Wechsler's 
1959 essay Toward Neutral Principles of Law, in 
which he contended that the decision was unprin­
cipled and contrary to basic tenets of constitutional 
govemmenL8 More recently, Professor Charles 
Lawrence and others have said that the Court in 
Brownlmissed the real wrong. Byfocusingonthe 
psychological har ms of segregation, th e Court 
missed the fact that the real harm of segregation is 
lhalisstigmalizesand subordinates African-Ameri­
cans. It has additionally been argued that because 
the court got the "right ' wrong in Brown I, the 
Supreme Court in the 1970s and 1980s was able 
to retreat from its commitment to civil rights. 
Just as the right has been attacked, so has the 
remedy. The limited remedy of Brown II - and in 
particular the "all deliberate speed" formulation -
did not promptly vindicate the rights of African-
Americans. In fact, ten years after Brown, only 
two percent of B lack children in the South at­
tended desegregated schools.10 
These two themes, the transformation that 
Brown created and the limits of that transforma­
tion, are the focus of the first potion of the tribute, 
"Brown and the Transformation of the Constitu­
tion." 
The first contribution was from one of the 
legends of the civil rights movement, Judge 
Constance Baker Motley. Judge Motley partici­
pate din all of the major education cases during her 
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two decades with the Legal Defense Fund, includ­
ing both Brown and Brown II, in which she was 
one of the attorneys who wrote the briefs that the 
Legal Defense Fund submitted to the Supreme 
Court. Judge Motley places Brown in the context 
of the earliest civil r ights cases that eroded the 
force olPlessy v. Ferguson,11 and assess the impact 
of the Brown decision. The second speaker, 
Professor Mark Tushnet, speaking from the van­
tage point of historian and legal scholar, probed 
the gap between Brown I's right and Brown II's 
remedy, and concluded that the "al l deliberate 
speed" formulation ultimately, andironically, con­
tributed to the rise of judicial activism and modem 
public law litigation. Then Judge Louis Pol lak 
spoke. He is a long-time adviser to the NAACP 
Legal Defense Fund, one of the attorneys who 
wrote the brief in Brown II, and author of the 
article, Racial Discriminatbn and Judicial Integ­
rity. A Reply to Professor Wechsler}1 Although 
then-Professor Pollak disagreed with the Court's 
reasoning, that article provided one of the most 
important defen ses of the constitutional legiti­
macy of the holding in Brown. Judge Pollak 
discussed the generative power of Brown's com­
mitment to the principle of equality, a power that 
he sees manifested in the Supreme Court's juris­
prudence of the next quarter-century. 
The second portion of "Civil Rights in Educa­
tion after Brown," focused on a specific aspect of 
Brown's legacy: the on-going campaign to end 
school segregation. Four attorneys who played an 
important and distinguished role in litigating post-
Brawn civil rights cases will focus on one or two 
of the education cases on which they worked and 
the lessons that can be drawn from those experi­
ences. 
The cases are for the most part, a second genera­
tion of segregation cases - second generation not 
merely in terms of chronology, but also second 
generation in teams of the type of case. The focus 
is no longer primarily, as it was in the years 
immediately following Brown, on the South, al­
though it remains in the South as well. These are 
cases in which educational 
segregation is inextricably linked to segregation in 
housing, and in which segregation in housing is a 
product of White flight as much as it is a product 
of segregation within the town or the city. 
The problems posed by these cases are more 
complex, but the underlying issues remain largely 
thesameaslhey wereinBram Whatisthenature 
of theconstitutionalrights involved" Whatkindof 
remedyisappropriateforthose rights? Whatisthe 
relationshipbetweentherightsarticulatedby courts 
and the remedies that they require to be followed? 
What is the relation between judicial enunciation 
of rights and remedies and popular support for 
civil rights? To these questions, however, a new 
oneisadded: Doesthemorecomplexnatureofthe 
(Continued on page 5) 
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segregation involved necessitate a different 
kind of remedy? 
Mr. Conrad Harper, a member of the 
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational 
Fund's staff from 1965 to 1970, discussed 
Harkless v. Sweeny Independent School 
District," a casewhichplayedanimportant 
role in the eventually successful challenge 
lo Monroe v. Pope's^ baxia civil rights suits 
against municipalities. Mr. Harper argued 
that the case illustrates how the Legal De­
fense Fund successfully combated hos tile 
precedent. Professor Drew Days, a former 
Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights 
and First Assistant Counsel for the NAACP 
Legal Defense Fund, offered the 
Ffillsborough County, R orida school de­
segregation case15 as an example of how 
integration can be successfully achieved. In 
a dramatically different tone, Judge 
Nathaniel Jones, NAACP General Counsel 
for a decade, discussed Milliken v. Bradley16 
Milliken was the critical case in the attempt to 
apply the principles enunciated in Brown to North-
em schools, and, Judge Jones eloquently declares, 
the Supreme Court's decision in Milliken I was a 
"watershed" event in the retreat from the Court's 
commitment to racial equality. The final speaker 
was Professor Theodore Shaw. Professor Shaw 
was a trial attorney in the Civil Rights Division of 
the Department of Justice, Assistant Counsel and 
Directorof theEducalionDocketfortheNAACFs 
Legal DefenseFund,andWesternRegional Coun­
sel for the Legal Defease Fund. He discussed 
Missouri v. Jenkins17 and Dowell v. Board of 
Education.18 Professor Shaw used these cases as 
evidence of the complexity of the school desegre­
gation issue, of the difficulties that those who hope 
to cany on in the tradition of Justice Marshall must 
confront, and of the importance of carrying on that 
traditioa 
The closing remarks came from the program's 
moderator, Mr. Paul Dimond, a distinguished 
scholar and former Director of the National 
Lawyer's Committee for Civil Rights under Law. 
Mr. Dimond suggested that an "anti-caste" prin­
ciple informs the Supreme Court's decision in 
Brown and argues for its revival. Returning to the 
theme of the difference between the right and the 
remedy in Brown, Mr. Dimond defended the 
appropriateness of separating right and remedy. 
He argued that the combination of the enunciation 
of broad constitutional principles and th e use of 
constrained judicial remedies acknowledges limi­
tations on judicial power while permitting coali­
tion building 
Taken all together, the speakers, illust rate the 
many dimensions of Brown's legacy. The panel­
ists' comments demonstrate that the promise of 
Brown remains and may well long remain unful­
filled. But the weight of their remarks is to mark 
and celebrate a triumph. The comments show the 
way in which the decision's support for the prin­
ciple of racial equality empowered the civil rights 
movement and shaped subsequent constitutional 
and legal developments on a host of fronts, and 
they show how Brown set an aspirational standard 
against which subsequent developments wou ld 
be tested. 
The remarks of the speakers also underscored 
the incomparable significance of the career of 
Justice Thurgood Marshall. The speakers dis ­
cussed Justice Marshall in many different con­
texts. They spoke of him as a colleague, as a 
Supreme Court Justice, as a hero. Regardless of 
how they know him, the common thread is that he 
touched their lives. Although in different ways, 
eachofthespeakershasbeenafighterforthecause 
of racial justice and equality. In that struggle, each 
of the panelists was clearly inspired and chal­
lenged by Thurgood Marshall. It is this ability to 
challenge and inspire countless mm and women 
-just as much as it is his role in personally shaping 
the l aw - that constitutes Thurgood Marshall's 
legacy. 
Closing Remarks: Paul Dimond 
As I was intimately involved in trying all aspects 
of Milliken, I would like to begin by sharing my 
seasoned observations about that case. First, in 
considering the meaning of Milliken, it seems to me 
thalthcpublicmcssagcof AfrMen/andMillikenll, 
in combination, is that racial segregation in 
metropolitan Americaisinnocentonccyour 
get beyond the inner-city boundary: it's no 
one'sfaultandit'snoone'sresponsibility. At 
the same time, the Burger Court bent over 
backwards to permit an order against a stale 
authority to infuse funds into an inner-city 
school district proven guilty of de jure 
segregation. In its own way, Milliken can 
best be understood as a "separate but equal" 
result for our times. 
Second I want you to think with me about 
the choices made in the proces s of this 
major constitutional litigatioa In Milliken, 
we had fifty-seven trial days to make our 
| case in the trial court At the start of the trail, 
s» District Judge Stephen Roth, an immigrant 
from Hungary said, "I made it and I don't 
understand why Blackscannot" He invited 
us out of his courtroom, literally, twice in 
preliminary motions. Yet like the justice of 
the peace that he was, JudgeRoth agreed to sit there 
and hear all the evidence. By the end of that fifty-
seven days, he was convinced that the State of 
Michigan was an integral partofa system of racial 
ghettoization in which there was an expanding core 
of Black families in Black neighborhoods always 
confined within a line separate and distinct from a 
receding ring of White schools and White neigh­
borhoods. 
When it got near the end of the trial, in what has 
been describe d as thinking about remed y while 
hearing the evidence of violation, I recall Judge 
Roth said, "My God, if fin going to limitremedy to 
the boundary of the school dis trict of the City of 
Detroit, Til merely be imposing - and giving my 
imprimatur to - the latest line of contain ment of 
segregation." 
As it came about, when the case hit the Supreme 
Court, the remedy that Judge Roth then con tem­
plated, which involved some fifty-four school dis­
tricts, had been vacated by the court of appeals on 
procedural grounds. As a result, the only issue 
before the Supreme Court was whether or not Judge 
Roth'sconceptionofviolation was accurate, whetha 
or not even one single Black child would be able to 
cross that latest line of racial containment. 
Courts make choices when they hear cases. In 
Milliken I, the majority chose to ignore their oppor­
tunity. Instead, the Burger Court's majority opinion 
proceeds with a recitation of how the district judge 
was a radical who unilaterally reached out to rope 
in all of the suburbs through massive cross-district 
busing, because he did not happen to like the racial 
composition of majority-Black schools. The ma­
jority opinion has no conception of the Court's 
(Continued on page 6) 
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opportunity to issue a Brown 1 violation ruling for 
our time by deferring the consideration of remedy 
for another day. The opportunity wets before the 
Burger Court to find a violation which would have 
required n o remedy at that point in time, which 
could have permitted a remand for exactly the type 
of transformative political, judicial, and social result 
that followed from Brown II. /nstead, because the 
Court was so concerned about, let's say, the political 
ramifications of what it was doing - and I will add, 
at least in part because it was so focused on remedial 
considerations - it never even thought about grasp­
ing this opportunity. 
Fatally, let me share one final irony in Milliken. 
Timing, as some say, is everything. Justice Harry 
Blackmun was the swing vote in the 54 majority in 
Milliken II. Three years later, four years later, and 
five years later, he was the seeing vote that provided 
the victories for the plaintiffs, not only in the central 
school district cases from Dayton and Columbus, 
but also a statewide, cross-district, metropolitan 
case from Wilmington, Delaware. 
Think about Supreme Court Justices. Theirs is 
not the single case that tests whatever their ideology 
or judicial philosophy may be against the weight of 
evidence; rather, it is the series of cases that come 
before the Justices over a course of years. I ask the 
question, then, if AMife/thadonly come three years 
later, where would the law and the national con­
science of the country be today with respect to the 
issues of racial discrimination? 
I would like to turn, from such speculation about 
the past, in order to think about the future of judicial 
review in race cases. Think, fw a moment, about the 
possibilities for change if we focus more of our 
energy, more of our evidence, more of our political 
debate, and more of our legal argument on the actual 
violation. Consider the possibilities ifwe infuse our 
proof of violation with a greater reach and worry 
less about the extent of court-ordered remedy. 
Could this provide a way to continue the debate, as 
Ted Shaw called it, in order to assure a more open 
judicial process? 
Do not despair about the potential fw such trans­
formation simply because of the narrowing of the 
Burger and Rehnquist Courts. After all, in atribute 
to Justice Marshall, I think it is appropriate to note 
that our situation today is far less bleak than was his. 
Today, there are no laws at the books that exclude 
anybody by race If om jobs, from public accommo­
dations, from public facilities, from public schools, 
from conveyances, from owning property. There 
are no signs on drinking fountains or bathrooms 
saying "Whites only."... 
So, rather than ftjrther bemoaning the narrowing 
of civil rights under the Rehnquist and Burger 
Courts, I ask you to look forward with me. Let us 
ask whether we can change the terms of the debate 
about discriminati on as it may still exist in the 
country. 
I do not want to suggest a grand political, or even 
litigation, strategy in order to give greate r public 
meaning today to Justice Marshall's great victory in 
Brown. Allow me, instead to suggest a narrower 
principle. It has three elements: 
First, the legal basis for the claim of discrimina­
tion must be broad enough to include all racial, 
ethnic, and gender groups. 
We can see the future of the country in the three 
fastest growing states - Florida, Texas, and Califor­
nia. By the year 2000, the majority of the children 
in those states are going to be minorities, and the 
largest minority in each of those states is going to be 
Hispanic, not African-American. 
Second, the legal basis for the claim of discrimi­
nation must be deep enough to admit all manner of 
proof of wrongdoing. It is essential that there be 
room for evidence of a dominant majority, singling 
out and marking by caste, a particular minority 
group for abuse, neglect, or disregard, whether in 
single acts - no matter how isolated - or in complex 
patterns - no matter how interwoven. A no-fault 
theory of discrimination has no moral claim on the 
conscience of any court or on the country. 
Third, the basis for the discrimination claim must 
be restrained enough to recognize that the first 
obligation is to plumb the full extent and depth of 
any such caste wrong, not to evaluate the extent and 
limits for the courts' remedial powers, (emphasis 
added) 
We should concede that the more massive and 
entrenched the wrong of discrimination, the more 
important it is for the courts to declare the lull extent 
of that wrong. The courts must also permit th e 
ultimate remedy t o be worked out in a political 
process in which those who are grieved will at least 
have a continuing claim that the declared wrong 
cannot be remedied in the courts alone. 
By now, we should all be mature enough to 
understand the limits of courts in exercising their 
counter majoritarian powers and their function of 
judicial review. I suggest that we ought to think 
about doing so with respect to remedy- much as the 
Warren Court did in Brown II. 
This restrained approach to court-ordered rem­
edies in cases of entrenched discriminati on will 
have one additional benefit It will encourage the 
building of political coalitions and affirmative rem­
edies that are sufficiently inclus ive a s to make 
irrelevant remedial classification along the lines of 
the original discriminatioa 
With respect to remedy, I also think we need to 
recognize that in a free society empowering real 
personal choices fw individuals is not necessarily 
inconsistent with remedying even the most en­
trenched discrimination against minority groups. 
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In sum, I ask that you consider whethe r we 
should seek a rebirth of what I have dubbed else­
where the "anli'caste'principle." I believe this prin­
ciple undergirds the Fourteenth Amendment as 
originally interpreted in Strauder v. West Virginia 
and explains and informs Brown. The alternative it 
seems to me is to continue with a suspect classifica­
tion analysis, some kind of modified tow-tier ap­
proach, i n which the only judicially cognizable 
claims of wrongdoing will b e those rare aberrant 
acts today when somebody makes a mistake and 
speaks explicitly of race. In fact, the primary cases 
that will be challenged under this wooden approach 
to judicial review of racial discrim ination will be 
those in which the majority, for whatever reason, 
decides that it wishes to try to provide affirmative 
relief to minorities. 
What is the risk of trying the anti-case principle? 
Isn't the risk the same as it was in 1896 at the time 
of the Plessy v. Ferguson decision? Couldn't the 
Rehnquist Court say "There is no longer any caste 
discrimination in America based on today's facts? 
Yet, let us consider what is different about today 
from 1896. We have the right of free speech 
guaranteed, and we have the right for all to vote 
guaranteed If such an awful judgment emerged 
from the Rehnquist Court, we would at least have 
the opportunity to continue the debate in the politi­
cal arena on terms that involve fundamental right 
and wrong. 
I would like to leave you with this last thought 
I submit that the anti-caste principle can empower 
us to debate, both in the Court and across the 
country, in this decade and into the next century, 
whether the second Reconstruction should con­
tinue. Keeping this dialogue with conscience open 
is a far worthier legacy of Brown and Justice 
Marshall than allowing a conservative Rehnquist 
Court to slowly but surely shut thedoorof the Court, 
and with itthe conscience of the country, to virtually 
all claims of wrongful discriminatioa** 
**SeveralmonthsafterthetributetoJusticeMarshall, 
the Supreme Court issued its ruling in the higher 
education case arising in Mississippi, UnitedStates 
v. Fordice, 112 SCl 2727 (1992). Although one 
ruling in a particular case is not dispositive, I am 
encouraged that a clear majority on the Rehnquist 
Court found a continuing violation in the dual 
system of higher education and remanded without 
specific instructions as to remedy so that the parties 
- within the political process - would confront the 
unremedied wrong. That this case arose in the 
context of volunta ry choices in higher education 
(rather than the conditions of mandato ry assign­
ments in elementary an d secondary schoo ling), 
may well have the Court to examine the extent of 
the wrong and to accept the limits for court-ordered 
remedies more fully. See generally Anti-Caste 
(Continued on page 7) 
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Principle, supra note 7, at45-50. 
It would appear that Justice Tluirgood Marshall 
lives on not only in our hearts, but also lives on in 
The Court. 
Edited by WJ.O. 
The Barrister would like to thank the Fordham 
Law Review for authorization to p ublish the 
edited version ohheSymposium,Brown v.Board 
ofEducation audits Legacy: A Tributetojustice 
ThurgoodMarshall; and Fordham Law Profes­
sor William M. Treanor. 
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CHILDREN'S ISSUES: 
TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AND 
ABUSE AND NEGLECT 
The Pare ntal Right to Atte nd He arings was re cently 
decided vi a In re Q uevedo, 419 S£2d 158 (N.C. Cl App. 
1992). TrialcowtsrefwaltoproYideforthetransportalion 
of an inca rcerated father to his term ination of parental 
rights he aring did not violate the father's due process rights. 
A p etition w as filed i n N orth C arolina t o t erminate the 
parental rights of a father who was incarcerated in Massachu­
setts. Prior to tr ial, t he f ather's c ourt-appointed la wyer 
motioned to have the Mia transported from prison to attend 
the hearing or to postpone the hearing until the fattier could 
attend. Hi e trial court denied this motion. T he attorney then 
movedfor ftmds to transport the fattier from prison in order to 
take his deposition T his motion was also dotted. H owever, 
the father was permitted to submit affidavits at the hearing. 
The hearing was held without the father present (his attorney 
attended). His p arental r ights were terminated and he ap­
pealed, claiming his due process rights had been violated. 
The Court of Appeals of North Carolina affirmed, finding no 
due process violation The court recognized a parent's due 
process right to be present at a termination of parental r ights 
proceeding was not absolute. Todelerminewhefliertheiather 
was entitled to be transported to the hearing, the court referred 
to the factors set forth by the United States Supreme Court in 
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 US. 319 (1976): (1) the private 
interests affected, (2) the risk of error created by the procedure, 
and (3) the government's interest in using the procedure 
The court found the father's interest in his child would be 
affected by t he proceeding, and recognized that i nterest as 
extremely impoitanL I t also found the state's interests in the 
child's welfare, reducing costs, and the security of prisoners 
were significant, and out-weighed the father's interest Fi­
nally, it d etermined the risk of e rror in c onducting th e 
termination h earing w ithout th e f ather p resent w as s light 
Although the lather was not able to present evidence in person 
and help his attorney with cross-examination, he was allowed 
to sutmit an affidavit This affidavit explained wiiy he had not 
seen his daughters and described his attempts to contact them. 
In light of this affidavit and his attorney's ability to conduct 
cross-examination, th e c ourt c oncluded th e re sult o f th e 
hearing would not have been different if the father had been 
present Thus, his due process rights had not been violated. 
Tic court made a final observation that the father's rights 
would have been better protected if he had been transported 
to North Carolina and deposed. According to the court, "when 
an incarcerated parent is denied tran^ortation to the hearing 
in contested termination ca ses, the better practice is for t he 
court, when so moved, to provide the funds necessary for the 
deposing of the incarcerated parent" 
Abuse, Neglect and Hearsay 
The issue of die R eliability of C hildren's Hearsay was 
discussed in State v. Edwards, 485 N.W2d 911 (Min n. 
1992). Child's hear say sta tement shou ld not hav e been 
excluded unde r the catc h-all exception based on di e trial 
courfs finding that the ch ild w as incompetent to testify at 
trial 
Defendant was charged with sexually abusing his wife's 
seven-year-old granddaughter. A rt a pretrial hearing, the trial 
court determined the child was not competent to testily at trial. 
On this basis, the trial court denied the state's motion to admit 
certain out-of-court statements made by the child. Th ecourt 
of appeals ultimately affirmed the trial court's decision that the 
child's s tatements w ere n ot a dmissible under t he e xcited 
utterance and "catch-all" exceptions. 
The Supreme Court of Minnesota reversed. Th ree out-of-
court statements by the child WOT at issue: on e made to the 
911 o perator im mediately f ollowing th e in cident, a nother 
made to a police officer who responded to the call minutes 
alter the incident, and a third matte to a different officer at the 
hospital approximately one hour a fter t he incident At the 
outset th e c ourt h eld th at th e first tw o s tatements w ere 
admissible under the excited utterance exception 
The court then turned to the child's third hearsay statement 
made to the officer at the hospital. Th e court assumed this 
statement did not qualify' as an excited utterance, but found it 
was admissible under the catch-all exception. The United 
States S upreme Court in I daho v . W right 49 7 U .S. 8 05 
(1990), required that to satisfy the confrontation clause, an 
out-of-court statement may not be admitted under the catch­
all (o r re sidual) ex ception u nless it po ssess "p articular 
guarantees o f t rustworthiness." Th ese guarantees must be 
determined from the totality of the circumstances surrounding 
the making of the statement L ooking at these circumstances, 
the court noted the child appeared to be frightened when she 
made the statement and had no apparent motive to lie. Th e 
statement itself was not the type a child would be expected to 
fabricate. In addition, the officer did not have a preconceived 
idea of wh at th e c hild w ould say. Finally, th e c hild's 
statements were internally consistent during the interview and 
had "an immediately apparent 'ring of credibility.'" 
An out-of-court statement should not be considered per se 
unreliable if madeby in incompetent witness. The courtfound 
the child's incompetency reflected on her ability to testily in 
court rather than on her ability to perceive the incident and 
accurately relate iL S ince the circumstances sunounding the 
child's making of the statement indicated the statement was 
reliable, the statement should have been admitted under t he 
catch-all e xception 
Edited by WJ.O. 
The Barrister would like to thank The ABA Juvenile 
and Child Law Reporter for the permission to print 
these edited versions of the articles which were pub­
lished in the January 1993 edition. 
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Light On The Rape HALLway: 
North Carolina Sheds Some Light on the Admissibility of Evidence of 
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 
Over the past several years our courts have 
become more sensitive to the long-term effects 
suffered by victims of rape. These effects are 
known as post-traumatic stress disorder or 
PTSD.l Symptoms ofPTSD include feelings 
of anxiety, frustration, depression, hyper-vigi­
lance, hyper-awareness, alarm, and endanger-
ment; - rape victims can also experience a 
general fear of men. In addition, an accompa­
nying conversion reaction mayresult where the 
victim suffers from a neurologicall y inexpli­
cable paralysis caused by the psychological 
trauma of the rape. 
While the effects ofPTSD and conversion are 
well documented. American courts have 
struggled in determining when this evidence 
may be admitted in a criminal trial TheNorth 
Carolina Supreme Court recently decided this 
issue in State v. Hall} hi Hall the court limited 
the use ofPTS D and conversion evidence. This 
[edited] article will discuss toe soundness of 
such limitations and toe practical difficulties 
that juries will undoubtedly face in trying to 
follow a judge's instruction as to toe limited 
admissibility of evidence ofPTSD and conver­
sion. 
In February of 1988, Donney Ray Hall was 
indicted for second degree rape and second 
degree sexual activity byasubstituteparenL At 
trial the fifteen-year old stepdaughter of toe 
defendant referred to a s MM, testified that 
after midnight onFcbruary 14,1988, toe defen­
dant entered her room and had intercourse with 
her. The Stale offered no physical evidence that 
a rape had occurred. The state did present 
evidence that MM. had suffered PTS D and 
conversion by way of the testimony of three 
health care professionals, two doctors and a 
clinical social worker, who had cared for M.M. 
in the months after the alleged rape. The basis 
of their collective testimony was that MM "fa 
the 'profile'of sexually abusedchildren, that she 
suffered a neurologically inexplicable paraly­
sis known as 'conversion reaction,' which is 
caused by severe psychobgical trauma, anxi­
ety, or depressbn; and that she was suffering 
from post-traumatic stress disorder, which in­
volves psychobgical responses to certain emo­
tionally traumatic events"* 
The defendant objected to the testimony by 
the health care professionals, but all objections 
were denied. The trial court admitted toe 
testimonies, but did not give any limiting in­
structions to the jury as to the use of toe PTSD 
and conversion evidence. As such, toe jury 
found the defendant guilty of sec ond degree 
rape and sexual activity by a substitute parenL 
The defendant thai appealed to the North Caro­
lina Court of Appeals. 
The appeals court upheld the convictioa On 
toe issue of the admissibility of toe PTSD 
conversion evidence, the court held that toe 
evidence was admissible because the testimony 
would help toe jury determine if MM. had been 
raped. In addition, the court held that toe 
evidence of PTSD and conversion would help 
toe jury understand the behavior of sexually 
abused children and aid in assessing toe crcd-
ibilityofthe victim asawitness.5 Thedefendant 
appealed to the North Carolina Supreme Court 
On discretionary review, the North Carolina 
Supreme Court, in a four to three decision, 
overturnedthe convictioa Sincethiswasacase 
of first impression for the supreme court, toe 
court relied on case law from outside jurisdic­
tions, specifically California and New York, in 
determining toe admissibility of PTSD and 
conversion evidence. In toe opinion written by 
ChiefJusticeExum, toecourt held that evidence 
of PTSD and conversion was properly admis­
sible if relevant but the evidence could not be 
admitted for the purpose of proving that the rape 
actually occurred.6 
The court cited two reasons for limiting toe 
admissibility of PTSD and conversion evi­
dence: "first, psychiatric procedures in devel­
oping the diagnosis are designed for therapeu­
tic purposes and are not reliable as fact finding 
tools to determine whether a rape has in fact 
occurred"7 "..second, the potential for preju­
dice boms large because the jury may accord 
too much weight to expert opinions stating 
medical conclusions which were drawn from 
diagnostic methods having limitedmeritasfact 
finding devices."' 
The court was concerned that a number of 
different traumatic events, in addition to rape, 
could create symptoms ofPTSD or conversion. 
Thecourtdidexplain, however, thatevidenceof 
PTSD and conversion could be admitted for 
corroborative purposes such as explaining the 
complainanfspost-assault behavior or aiding in 
toe complainants credibility as a witness. The 
court explained that the purpose fa which 
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PTSD and conversion evidence is offered will 
determine toe evidence's admissibility. 
The court held that because the state presented 
no physical evidence of rape or sexual abuse, the 
trial judge erred in failing to give a limiting 
instruction to the jury on toe admissibility of the 
PTSD and conversion evidence. The court held 
that toe defendant had shown, as required by 
North Carolina General Statutes, that there was 
areasonableprrobabilily that the defendantwould 
have been acquitted absent the PTSD and con­
version evidence. Therefore, toecourtremandcd 
toe case for retrial 
Justice Wichard dissented on the ground that 
toe majority's decision concerned the "weightor 
credibility of toe evidence, and not its admissibil­
ity." Justice's We bb and Mitchell joined in the 
dissent9 
PRIOR LAW AND PRACTICE 
The North Carolina Supreme Court had sev­
eral opportunities, prior to Hall to rule on the 
admissibility ofPTSD evidence. One of toe first 
instances was in State v. Clemmonsf In 
Clemmons, toe court refused to overturn toe 
defendant's conviction of rape. Despite conced­
ing that toe trial court made an improper ruling in 
admittingevidenceofthedefcndant'spriorsexual 
misconduct towards a female, toe court held that 
there was overwhelming evidence against the 
defendant Particularly, toe court stressed the 
evidence of "severe (PTSD) for a lengthy period 
immediately following the incident"11 This dicta 
indicated toe court's willingness to allow PTSD 
evidence in a rape trial through toe court did not 
specifically rule on PTSD evidence. 
In State v. Stafford, a rape tr ial a doctor 
testified about the symptoms ofPTSD present in 
toe victim. The court held that toe doctor's 
testimony regarding PTSD was hearsay and not 
within the North Carolina Rule 803 (4) excep­
tion. Thecourtheldthattoestaiementsmade,by 
the victim, to the doctor were in preparation for 
trial and were not made for medical purposes. 
Thecourtstated, however, "Weneitherreach nor 
decide the question of whether in a proper case 
expert testimony concerning (PTSD) will be 
admitted in the trial courts of this state."13 
In Godwin,14 a sexual offense and attempted 
rape case, toe court found that toe state had not 
properly laid the foundation to qualify the clini­
cal social worker witness as an expertonPTSD. 
(Continued on page 9) 
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Hie court found that the admission of the wit­
ness'testimony was improper and ordered a new 
trial; bu t the court refused to decide whether 
PTSD evidence was admissible in North Caro­
lina. 
Evidence of PTSD, has been considered in a 
number of other jurisdictions. In People v. Tay­
lor 15, New Yak's highest court, after it under­
took an exhaustive review of almost every 
jurisdiction that has ruled o n PTSD evidence, 
held that whether PTSD evidence will be admis­
sible depends on the purpose for which it is being 
offered. In Taylor the court noted that many 
jurisdictions allow the introduction of PTSD 
into evidence, but that there was "no uniform 
approach to the admission of evidence of 
(PTSD)..."16 
The Taybr court also noted that, in California, 
evidence of PTSD was not admissible to prove 
that the rape actually occurred. However, Cali­
fornia, along with Kansas, West Virginia, Mary­
land, Arizona, M ontana, and Iowa, have al-
lowedPTSDevidencewhere the Issue is whether 
or not sex was consensual. Colorado, Indiana, 
Oregon, Hawaii, New Hampshire, Delaware, 
Connecticut, and Vermont, have also admitted 
PTSD evidenceas a defense, "toexplain behav­
ior exhibited by the complainant that might be 
viewed as inconsistent with a claim of rape. 17 
Only Missouri, Washington, andPennsylvania, 
have specifically refused to allow expert testi­
mony of PTSD. 
ANALYSIS 
Courts will always attempt to protect theJudicial 
process and insure that defendants have a fair 
trial - furthermore, judges must defer to the 
expertise of medical personnel in determining 
the validity of new diagnoses. The North Caro­
lina Supreme Court waited six years to make a 
specific ruling on the admissibility of PTSD and 
conversion of evidence - from State v. 
Clemmons,18 in 1986, to Hall in 1992 While 
properly considering precedent in other jurisdic­
tions and the recognition of PTSD as a diag­
nosed disorder, the North Carolina supreme 
arurt has madeanecessary and cautious attempt 
to deal with one of the latest medical diagnoses. 
In Hall, the court recognized "the inherent 
prejudicial dangers of a per se admissibility of 
PTSD testimony." By emphasizing the purely 
therapeutic role of physicians and social work­
ers, the court distinguished why the testimony of 
PTSD and conversion can not be accepted as a 
true fact-finding tool Furthermore, by rccog-
(Continued on page 13) 
UPDATE: THE ABC'S OF THE ABA: 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
- WHY A REQUIRED COURSE? 
I the previous edition of The Barrister it was 
reported that it appeared North Carolina Cen­
tral university's School of Law has, and contin­
ues to, require all third year students to take 
Statutory Interpretation in direct violation of 
the American Bar Association's...Council of 
the Section of the Section of Legal Education 
and the Accreditation Committee Standards 
301 and 302 
In summary, Standards 301 and 302 denote 
that a law school may offer a course fa1 im­
proving student performance for bar examina­
tions. However, law schools may NOT offer 
such a course for academic credit OR AS A 
CONDmONTO GRADUATION. Thecase 
was made that the course called Statutory 
Interpretation was at best, a mini review of 
those courses tested on the North Carolina bar 
exam which were NOT required courses. 
It was suggested that the administration and 
the SB A lode into the matter before the ABA 
brought the matter to the attention of the law 
school. 
Since the publication of that article the fol­
lowing has transpired: 
• The SB A contacted the administration 
of the law school and was told that 
because the matter was not addressed 
before publication it would not be dis­
cussed with The Barrister staff. More­
over, the administrator indicated it would 
not discuss a- put the matter on the 
agenda of any faculty meeting. This of 
course suggests that the administration 
is content to deal with form rather than 
substance. 
• Apparently the faculty did have the 
common sense and decency to discuss 
the matter at a faculty meeting. How­
ever, the administrations's position 
showed the usual inflexibility. The 
administration again refused to "look 
into" the matter and basically said-if an 
when the ABA comes here and tells us to 
change - then well change. Unfortu­
nately for all students, the administration 
opts, once again, to "circle the wagons." 
• Now for the good news. Student & 
facility response to the article was quite 
favor able. Moreover, it was then 
suggested that because of the 
administration's 'nonresponse,' that a 
petition be drafted and submitted to the 
ABA Accreditation Committee asking 
for an investigation of the matter. The 
petition was drafted, last semester, dur­
ing the last day of class but we obtained 
a sufficient number of 'signatures' even 
though the majority of students did not 
get to see or sign the petitioa 
• The petition was sent to the ABA and 
a recent telephone call determined that 
the petition was inadvertently placed in 
afilewithoutanyfurtherfollow-up. The 
ABA attorney indicated that the matter 
would be addressed post-haste and that 
The Barrister would be given a status 
report in the near future. 
• If the ABA determines that the petition 
constitutes validfacts, with regard to the 
Standards, the ABA will then send a 
copy of the petition to the Dean of the 
Law School and request that the Dean 
respond to the allegations in the petition 
and to provide any additional informa-
tionrequiredby the ABA. Further, upon 
receipt of the response of the Dean of the 
Law School, the ABA will either 
a) Dismiss the complaintif the ABA 
determines that the petition and the 
Dean'sresponse considered together 
donot support a claim that the school 
is in non-compliance with the Stan­
dards. 
b) Place the petition on the agenda 
for the next site evaluation of the 
Law School if the ABA determines 
that the complaint and the Dean's 
response considered together indi­
cate conditions or practices that raise 
a question concerning the school's 
compliance with the Standards. 
• The Barrister will also attempt to 
have an editor and/or writer meet 
with Chancellor Chambers and ask 
for his assistance in this matter. 
Needless to say, the ABA's investigation will 
not likely impact or assist the present 3L class. 
However, the future 3L's can and should ben­
efit from our willingness and ability to question 
and challenge perceived inequities and injus­
tices. Isn't that why some of us are here?!? 
By: Bill Olynick 
404 (b) OR NOT 404 (b): IS THE QUESTION -
WHEN CHARACTER IS NOT CHARACTER 
Professor Thomas M. Ringer, Jr. - North Carolina Central University School of Law 
Rule 404(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Evi­
dence is generally known as the "other purposes" 
clause or the "other wrongs, crimes or acts" clause. 
It reads as follows: 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is 
not admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show that he acted in 
conformity therewith. It may, however, be 
admissiblefor other purposes, suchas proof 
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake, entrapment or accident. 
A clear understanding of Rule 401(b) requires an 
examination of related rules that address the admis­
sibility of cha racter evidence, such as 405(b) and 
404(a). According to Brandis On North Carolina 
Evidence, [cjharacter comprises the actual quali­
ties andcharacteristics ofanindividual, thepeculiar 
qualities impressed by nature and habit on the 
person, which distinguish him from others (Page 
As a general rule, character evidence is not admis­
sible in either criminal cases or civil cases unless: 
character is an ultima te issue in the case; or an 
accused in a criminal case "opens the door" to her 
pertinent character traits; or the defendant in a 
criminal case "opens the door" to the character of 
the victim of the alleg ed crim e, or character evi ­
dence is involved in impeaching a witness in either 
a criminal prosecution or a civil action. 
The "other purposes" clause of Rule 404(b) pro­
vides that other wrongs, crimes a- acts of an 
individual may be adm itted for any rele vant pur­
pose except to prove that the in dividual acted in 
conformity with his character at the time in ques­
tion. Therefore, Rule 404(b) does not constitute, an 
exception to the pro pensity rule. Evidence of an 
individual's wrongs, crimes or acts pursuant to Rule 
404(b) are not admitted as character evidence, per 
se. Rather, evidence of an individual's wrongs, 
crimes or acts are admitted fa- seme purpose other 
than to prove the character traits of the individual 
In practice, Rule404(b) is a prosecutor's rule that 
permits the State to circumvent the Propensity Rule 
by introducing past wrongs, crimes and acts of the 
defendant disguised as "other putposes" evidence. 
More than ninety percent of the reported North 
Carolina cases that address Rule 404(b) involve 
offers of proo f by the prosecution of "other pur­
poses" evidence relating to the collateral wrongs, 
crimes and acts of defendants in criminal cases. 
At least one North Carolina appellate court deci­
sion has stated that Rule404(b) is applicable only to 
parties in civil cases and usually to defendants in 
criminal cases. State v. Morgan, 315 N.C. 626,340 
S.E.2d 84 (1986). However, the language of the 
rule does not limit its application to the admission of 
collateral wrongs ofparties. Yet, theNorthCarolina 
supreme court recently rejected a defendant's con­
tention that Rule 404(b) could be used to prove the 
collateral acts of another individual as circumstan­
tial evidence that the other individual and not the 
defendantcommittedthecrimeinquestion State v. 
Richardson, 328 N.C. 505,402 S.E.2d 401 (1991). 
In a similar case, the North Carolina courtof appeals 
held that a defendant who was arrested, after a bag 
of cocaine was found under the seat of the truck that 
he was driving, was not entitled to offer in to evi­
dence the criminal recotd of the owner of the track 
for the purpose of showing that the owner of the 
track had probably acted in conformity with a 
previous conviction by p lacing cocaine undo- the 
seal The court held that the offer of proof was too 
speculative. State v. Chandler, N.C. App. 706,398 
S.E.2d 337 (1990). 
A discussion of Rule404(b) is particularly timely 
and topical in light of a trilogy of recent North 
Carolina supreme court decisio ns that have ad­
dressed the admissibility of "other purposes" 
evidence pursuant to Rule404(b). In Statev.Agee, 
the court upheld the admission of evidence relating 
to a prior offense even though the defendant had 
been acquitted of the prior offense. The court relied 
upon the "chain of circumstances" or res gestae 
doctrine to support the admission of the prior 
offense evidence. State v. Agee, 391 S.E.2d 171 
(1990). 
In State v. Stager, the court upheld the murder 
conviction of the defendant-wife for the murder by 
firearm of her second husband. During the tr ial of 
that case, the prosecution was allowed to offer 
evidence surrounding thedeathby firearmof defen­
dant-wife's first husband. The court upheld the 
admission of thi s "other purposes" evidence even 
tough the defendant-wife was never charged with 
or tried for the murder of her first husband and even 
tough the death of the first husband occurred 
approximately ten years prior to the death of 
defendant's second husband. State v Stager 406 
S.E.2d 876 (1991). 
The third and most intnguing of the cases was 
State v.Scott. The court reversed the kidnapping 
10 
and rape convictions of the defendant on the basis 
that the trial court had improperly admitte d testi ­
mony concerning a prior rape that had alleg edly 
occurred two years earlier but which had resulted in 
defendant's acquittal. The court held that the 
prejudicial effect of admitting a prior of fense for 
which the defendant had been acquitt ed would 
clearly outweigh its probative value pursuant to a 
Rule 403 analysis. State v. Scott, 413 S.E.2d 787 
(1992). 
In sum, these decisions raise nume rous issues 
relating to the proper interpretation of Rule 404(b). 
In Agee and Stager, the court followed a traditional 
approach in admitting "other purposes" evidence 
pursuant to Rules 404(b), 401 and 403. The more 
recent Scott decision, however, signifies a marked 
departure from established precede nt and repre­
sents an apparent change in the court's a nalytical 
approach and judicial attitude regarding the admis­
sibility of collatera l wrongs, crimes or acts. The 
majority opinion in Scott, authored by Chief Justice 
Exum, cited favorably the dissenting opin ion of 
Justice Brennan in Dowling v. United States, rather 
than the majority opinion of Justice White, which 
stated that evidence of a prior al leged offense for 
which the defendant had been acquitted was no t 
admissible. 
It is worth noting that North Carolina Evidence 
Rule 404(b) is modeled after and tracks the lan ­
guage of Federal Rule of Evidence404(b), with two 
exceptions. The main difference being that the 
Federal 404(b) rule includes a 1991 amen dment, 
which was revised by deleting the period at the end 
of the second sentence, and adding the follow­
ing notice provision: 
provided that upon request by the ac­
cused, the prosecution in a criminal case 
shall provide reasonable notice in ad­
vance of trial, or during trial if the court 
excuses pretrial notice on good cause 
shown, of the general nature of any such 
evidence it intends to introduce at trial." 
[FRE 404(b) as amended effective De­
cember 1,1991.] 
Hopefully, the North Carolina General Assembly 
will act promptly to add this notice provision to Rule 
404(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence. In 
the meantime, counsel for defen dants in criminal 
cases should continue to elicit this information 
through discoveiy and to suppress impermissible 
(Continued on page 15) 
THE CASE FOR SUBMITTING 
WRITTEN INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY 
G. Nicholas Herman - Adjunct faculty member at NCCU 
Over two-hundred years ago, Sir William BJackstone wrote that trial by jury is die "grand bulwark of 
[our] liberties."1 Yet, in die words of one trial judge, it is now commonly observed: "[w]henlread 
instructions to the pry, I hope that I will see a light go on in thejurors' eyes, but I never do.'*1 This 
rueful assessment has led a number of states to require that, along with oral instructions, thejury be 
given written instructions to take to die jury room. If ourjury system is truly to remain the bulwark of 
our liberties, North Carolina should do the same. 
THE PROBLEM OF COMPREHENSION 
The irony of the cunent North Carolina practice 
of oral instructions to the jury, is that numerous 
studies have shown that jurors have great difficulty 
understanding purely oral instructions. For ex­
ample, in the early 1970s a major study showed 
that 86%ofiurors in criminal cases misunderstood 
the standard of proof to convict, and less than 50% 
in civil cases understood the meaning of"probable 
cause."3 Later studies revealed an equally dismal 
portrait. Studies conducted in the mid 1970s 
showed that nearly 50% of jurors believed that 
"preponderance of the evidence" meant "a slow 
and careful pondering of the evidence," and more 
than 25% misunderstood definitions for "burden 
of proof" "impeach," "admissible evidence," and 
"inference."4 
Still later, in the 1980s even more sophisticated 
studies quantified the limited ability of juries to 
understand oral instruct ions. For example, one 
leading study of Texas jurors showed that only 
19% understood the definition of "neg ligence;" 
15% understood "probable cause;" 17% under­
stood "presumption of innocence;" and 19% 
understood instructions on "accomplice testi­
mony."5 
In sum, as bluntly put by one recent commen­
tator "[ajll of the empirical studies show juror 
comprehension of [oral] patten instructions to be 
so tow as to be dysfunctional." 6 In contrast, a 
number of these same studies have shown that 
when jurors are provided written instructions, their 
deliberations are more efficient; they are guided by 
a greater understanding of the law; and they have 
greater confidence in the correctness of their ver­
dict7 Thus, it is not surprising that the most 
frequent criticism of the jury-instruction pr ocess 
from jurors themselves is that the instructions are 
not provided to them in writing.8 
NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE 
Presently, the North Carolina General Statutes 
neither require nor expressly prohibit submitting 
written instructions to the jury. However, in State 
v. Frank and State v. Pearce9 the Supreme Court 
approved without requiring the practice of submit­
ting to the jury written instructions on the elements 
of offenses charged in a criminal case. Notwith­
standing these decisions, undo- current North 
Carolina practice written instructions are rarely - if 
ever-submitted to the jury incriminal or civil cases. 
This has not always been the practice. Beginning 
in 1885,G.S. 1-182 provided toatif any party to an 
action requested that the trial judge put his instruc­
tions in writing, "he must, at the request of either 
party to the action, allow the jury to take his 
instructions with them on their retirement..." The 
failure to strictly comply with this statute in civil or 
criminal cases required a new triaL10 In 1967, the 
statutewasrevisedtoapplyto criminal cases only.11 
Then, inexplicably, in 1977 the statute was reprealed 
altogether.12 
In its place, the legislature enactedRule51 of the 
N.C. Rules of Civil Procedure, and G.S. 15A-1231 
applicabletooiminalcases. These statutes prohibit 
toe trial judge from giving opinions on the facts of 
a case or the jury's verdict and spell out the respon­
sibilities of trial counsel in requesting specific 
instructions from the court Nothing is said about 
submitting written instructions to the jury. 
PRACTICE IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS 
As aresponse to the problem of jury comprehen-
sion, approximately twenty state have, at one time 
or another, permitted the submission written in­
structions in civil cases;13 and almost thirty have 
permitted the practice in criminal cases. 14 In as 
many as twenty states toe legislatures and courts are 
now silent on the subject and approximately four 
states have prohibited the practice outright in certain 
cases.15 
Of those states that allow the submission of 
written instructions, some - as in federal practice -
leave toe matte solely to the discretion of the trial 
judge,16 while others require the practice upon 
request of a party or the jury itself.17 At least six 
states make the practice mandatory.18 
When the submission of written instructions is 
permitted, the trial judge is still required to first 
charge the jury orally. Thewrilteninstructionsmust 
then consist of the complete final oral charge given 
by the trial judge. In addition, a number of cases 
have held that the instructions submitted should not 
be tainted b y underlinings, interlineat ions, nota-
11 
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tions,crossed-outpx)rtionsofthe text, or incom­
plete erasures.19 
ADVANTAGES AND DANGERS 
The most obvious advantage of written instruc­
tions is th at they markedly enhance the jury's 
comprehension of toe applicable law. Also, they 
permit juries to be more efficient and focused in 
their deliberations by eliminating excessive de­
bates about what the trial judge charged orally.20 
In light of these advantages, and because of toe 
critical importance that juries follow toe law as 
instructed by toe court, it may seem curious that 
toe practice of submitting written instructions has 
not been readily adopted in all jurisdictions. 
Some courts and commentators have sug­
gested certain dangers and practical problems in 
providing written instructions to the jury 21 The 
most common of these are: (1) that toe jury may 
misinterpret the instructions and debate the law; 
(2) that the jury may give undue emphasis to toe 
written instructions and de-emphasize toe fact­
finding function; and (3) that the courts have 
limited time and resources to make written in­
structions available to the jury.22 However, there 
are sound reasons why these reservations are 
unfounded. First, t he suggestion that toe jury 
might misinterpret the written instructions is fun­
damentally belied by their very purpose. The 
jury's ability to read the instructions militates 
against misinterpretation rather than fostering it 
Cautionary instructions should be given to toe 
jury that toe written materials are submitt ed to 
assist them in refreshing their recollection of toe 
trial judge's oral charge. Also, it should be 
emphasized that toe jury shouldalwaysrequest an 
explanation or clarification of toe law directly 
fiomthecourL Therefore, any risk of misinterpre­
tation or debate about toe law would be no greater 
than if the jury was only charged orally.23 
Second, the danger that the jury might overem­
phasize the written instructions and subordinate 
deliberations a bout toe evidence may also be 
overcome by appropriate cautionary instruc­
tions.24 One study found that juries given written 
instructions actually "concentrated more on toe 
relevant facts."25 In addition, if toe written 
(Continued on page 12) 
THE CASE FOR SUBMITTING WRITTEN 
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY 
inslructions embody the trial judge's complete 
oral charge, any risk that the jury might give 
undue emphasis to any portion of the instructions 
would again be no greater than if no written 
instructions woe provided at all 
Finally, the notion that courts have limited 
time and resources to make written instructions 
available to the jury is simply outdatedbytoday's 
trial procedure and word-processor technology. 
Under cunent North Carolina procedure, as in 
moststates, a conferenceon inslructions must be 
held between the trial judge and counsel in 
advance of delivering final instructions to the 
jury.26 During such a conference, the trial judge 
couldeasily delegate theresponsibility for typing 
and duplicating his final instructions to one of the 
parties for the jury. Anyminordelayoccasioned 
by that process would be far outweighed by the 
benefits of providing written instructions. 
In summary, the advantages of submitting 
written instructions to the jury greatly outweigh 
any perceived dangers or practical difficulties. 
Accordingly, the overwhelming authorities that 
have examined the subject have strongly advo­
cated sending written instructions to the jury 
room.27 
ADOPTING A NEW RULE 
The North Carolina General Rules of Practice 
for the superior and district courts, which include 
rules related to jury instructions,25 are promul­
gated by the supreme court which is "authorized 
to prescribe rules of practice and procedure for 
the superior and district courts supplementary to, 
and not inconsistent with acts of the general 
assembly."29 Because there are no North Caro­
lina statutory provisions that expressly prohibit 
submitting written instructions to the jury,30 any 
rule authorizing this practice could be promul­
gated by die supreme court alone. 
In adopting a rule that would authorize submit­
ting written instructions to the jury, the following 
procedures would be desirable: 
(1) The rule should require the submission 
of written instructions in civil and criminal 
cases upon motion of any party at the jury 
conference,31 or upon the trial judge's 
own initiative. 
(2) The written instructions should em­
body the final, verbatim oral charge given 
by the trial judge to the jury, and made a 
part of the record. 
(3) The responsibility for typing and 
duplicating the written instructions should 
rest with the party requesting the submis-
*(Continued from page 
sion or, in the event both parties make the 
request, upon the party with the burden of 
proof. 
(4) When the jury retires for deliberations, 
acopy of the written instructions should be 
provided to each juror s o that each has 
equal access to the instructions during 
deliberations.32 
(5) The written instruc tions should not 
contain underscoring, interlineations, no­
tations, crossed-out portions of the text, or 
incomplete erasures.33 
(6) The written instructions (and the oral 
charge) should contain cautionary instruc­
tions to the effect that the written materials 
are solely given as an a id to the jury's 
comprehension of the oral charge, and that 
the jury should always directly consult the 
court for any explanation or clarification 
about the instructions.34 
CONCLUSION 
Most judges and trial lawyers would agree that 
jurors are generally conscientious and discharge 
their duty with a genuine sense of responsibility. 
This salutary observation, however, cannot over­
come the limitations that hour-long oral 
instructionsplaceupon the jury's ability to under­
stand the applicable law. To suppose that our 
current jury-instruction practice is adequate to the 
jury's task is simply belied by common sease as 
wellasempiricalresearch. Thus,NorthCarolina's 
supreme court should adopt a new rule authoriz­
ing the submission of written instructions to the 
jury. Doing so would go a long way in relieving 
the jury from having to go , as Judge Learned 
Hand put it, "rummaging through a wildaness of 
veibage."35 
Edited byWJ.O. 
The Barrister would like to thank Attorney 
G. Nicholas Herman and the North Carolina 
State Bar Quarterly for permission to publish 
this edited version of the Fall1992 copyrighted 
article. 
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Light on the Rape HALLway: 
(continued from page 9) 
nizing that a lay jury is highly likely to bepersuaded 
by expert testimony of PTS D or conversion, the 
court protects the essential function of the jury; the 
jury, not the expert, is the finder of facts. 
The Hall court followed established evidentiary 
rules forexample Rule403, by demonstrating how 
PTSD and conversion evidence can create a 
"danger" of unfair prejudice" to the defendant In 
deciding, therefore, to disallow PTSD and conver­
sion evidence for the purpose of proving an actual 
rape, the Hall court ensures that the guilt or 
innocence of a defendant will be determined by an 
unprejudiced jury. 
Yet in not creating a per se ban on the admissi­
bility of PTSD and conversion evidence, the Hall 
court demonstrated the use of flexible rules that a 
court shouldemploy in orderto cope with theever-
improving world of science. The court recog­
nized that the reason for allowing expert testi­
mony under North Carolina Rule 702 is that 
neither a lay jury nor a judge can "know" all 
relevant information that may assist the trier-of-
facttoreachan informed decision. Furthermore, 
the court recognized that in certain circum­
stances nearperfect psychological evidencemay 
be as valuable, if not more valuable, than actual 
physical evidence. For example, in a rape trial, 
where the defendant is claiming consent by the 
victim, symptoms of PTSD can aid the jury. As 
one commentator has stated on therelevanceof 
rape trauma syndrome (RTS), a form of PTSD: 
[T]hal definition makes psychological 
"bruises" asarelevantasphysicalbruises 
in a consent-rape trial. Both certainly 
may resultfrommany causes. Neitherthe 
physician who testifies that a woman has 
physical bruises nor a psychobgist who 
testifies that a woman suffers from RTS 
can state unequivocally that the condition 
was caused by a specific incident of non­
consensual intercourse, yet the evidence 
of a victim's physical injuries is deemed 
cleanly relevant inarape case andadmis-
sibility of this is beyond doubt}9 
Therefore, the Hall court had two very good 
reasons to follow the lead ofNew York's highest 
court, by allowing the limited admissibility of 
PTSD and conversion evidence. First, by creat­
ing the ru le that tire purpose the evidence is being 
offeredforwilldetermineits 
admissibility, the North 
CarolinaSupremeCourthas 
given tria l judges the flex­
ibility to deal with innova­
tive and unreviewed uses of 
PTSD. Second, the supreme 
courthasrecognizedthatevi-
dence ofPTSD is a valuable 
tool for prosecutors to bol­
ster the credibility of a vic­
tim in a society that at times, 
wants to put the rape victim 
on trial and not the defen­
dant 
The dissent in Hall failed 
to provide the logical analy­
sis provided by the majority. 
More specifically, the dis­
sent provided no viable rea­
sons why potentially potent 
PTSD evidence did not or 
wouldnotcreateunfeirpreju-
dice in minds of the jurors. 
Furthermore, by declaring 
that the real issue should be 
the credibility and not the 
13 
admissibility of PTSD evidence, the dissent 
failed to recognize inherent danger of putting 
the rape victim on trial rather than the defendant 
Most jurisdictions, including North Carolina, 
have enacted rape-shield statutes to specifically 
avoid the focus of the trial from failing on the 
victim's previous sexual conduct and to prohibit 
the defense from probing into the past of the 
victim.20 While evidence of PTSD does not 
deal with previous sexual conduct of the victim, 
the effect of allowing the defense to probe into 
the trauma of the victim is potent ially just as 
damaging, creating a real danger of confusing 
the jury as to who is truly on trial.21 This is much 
more likely if PTSD and conversion are offered 
for substantive evidence because the jury will 
be allowed to occur to determine whether the 
victim was raped by looking at the resulting 
trauma, not as the facts existing at the time of 
alleged crime. 
The Hall decision, however, does leave some 
questions unanswered. F or instance, in a rape 
case where the defendant does not raise the 
issue of consent, such as in /Mhow will a jury 
be able to differentiate between PTSD evidence 
offered for credibility purposes and not for 
substantive purposes. Ev en with a strong lim­
iting instruction by the judge, isn't a jury likely 
to draw the conclusion that PTSD means the 
victim must have suffered some trauma? In 
addition, in a case where the jury is asked to 
differentiate between rape, attempted rape, 
sexualassault, attempted sexual assault, orsome 
other sex-related offense, what benefit will 
PTSDevidenceprovideindeterminingwhether 
technical statutory elements have been met? A 
jury may be likely to confuse evidence of 
trauma as evidence of the greater crime and not 
focus on the particular requirements of each 
crime. 
Another unanswered question is what would 
happen in a rape case where the defendant 
presentsevidencethatthe alleged victim has not 
suffered from PTSD? As one commentator 
suggests, courts mayriskestablishingthatPTSD 
is an unofficial element of rape." Yet another 
risk is that the jury may not feel that the statutory 
elements, dealing with lack of consen t by the 
victim, are met unless the victim has suffered 
PTSD. ThefinalquestionnotaddressedinHall 
is how does the evidentiary value and admissi­
bility literati ons change when PTSD is pre­
sented in a civil case? Undoubtedly, creative 
lawyers will seek the answers to these ques­
tions; letushope that our courts have the "right" 
answers. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision in Hall does represent the grow-
(Continued on page 14) 
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ing acceptance of psychological testimony in 
American jurisdiction. If anything, Hall repre­
sents a signal to women thk North Carolina 
courts arc dedicated to protecting women from 
rape offenders. 
The purpose of the PTSD and conversion 
evidence determines admissibility, but that pur­
pose can not be to prove that the rape actually 
occurred, In addition to helping lower courts, 
this rule will enable lawyers to esta blish new 
waysof using PTSDandconversionevidenceat 
triaL It remains to be seen, however, upon the re­
trial of Donnie Ray Hall, whether the jurors, 
particularly, c an a jury of twelve reasonable 
minds differentiate betw een evidence offered 
for corroborative as opposed to substantive pur­
poses. 
By: Jerry Smith 
Edited by WJO 
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collateral wrongs, crimes or acts by filing timely 
motions in limine. 
As the above preliminary discussion of s ome of 
the issues raised in recent North Carolina and 
federal appellate cases suggests, Rule 404(b) does 
not laid itself to a simple or mechanical application. 
The courts and litigants must address she factors in 
determining the admissibility of "other purposes" 
evidence pursuant to Rule 404(b) of the North 
Carolina Rules of Evidence: 
1. IDENTIFY THE SPECIFIC "OTHER 
PURPOSES" WHICH THE EVIDENCE OF 
OTHER WRONGS, CRIMES OR ACTS 
MAY PROVE. 
The threshol d consideratio n is to identify the 
specific purpose(s) for which collateral wrongs, 
crimes or acts would be admissible. The second 
sentence of Rule404(b) of the North Carolina Rules 
of Evidence lists ten "pigeonholes" or "other pur­
poses" which prior or subsequent offenses may 
prove: "motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 
plans, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake, 
entrapment or accident." (Rule404(b) of the North 
Carolina Rules of Evidence). In addition to the ten 
categorical puiposes s tated in Rule 404(b), "ther e 
are numerous other uses to which evidence of 
criminal acts may be put, and those enumerated are 
neither mutually exclusive nor collectively exhaus­
tive." (McCormick On Evidence, Fourth Edition, 
page 345). Several examples include the "chain of 
circumstances" or resgestae purpose; acts of ill-will 
to prove malice; uniqu e modus operandi; and to 
show a passion for unusual or abnormal sexual 
relations. 
The proponent of the "other purposes" evidence 
(typically, the prosecuting attorney) bears the bur­
den of iden tifying the speci fic purpose(s) that the 
other wrong, crime or act would tend to prove . In 
appropriate cases, the opponent to the admission of 
the "other puiposes" evidence should specifically 
object to the evidence on the ground that it does not 
fall within the "other purposes" clause of Rule 
404(b) sod, if the court overrules the objection, the 
opponent should force the proponent's attorney to 
state for the record the specific purpose for which 
the collateral wrong, crime or act is being offered. 
The main two advantages that the opponent gains 
by compelling the proponen t to state the explicit 
purpose fa which the collateral evidence is being 
tendered: (1) sometimes the proponent Ls unable on 
the spur of the moment to correctly identify the 
applicable 404(b) purpose; and (2) the statement of 
aparticular404(b)purpose has theeffect of painting 
the proponent of the evidence into a corner. During 
closing arguments or on appeal, the proponent 
cannot rely upon some other404(b) purpose that he 
did not previou sly iden tify. Also, by forcing the 
proponent of the evidence to explici tly state the 
purpose for which the collateral offense is being 
offered, the opponent is laying the groundwork for 
a possible appeal in the event th at the propone nt 
failed to state a proper pu rpose for admi tting the 
collateral evidence. 
2. DETERMINE THE LOGICAL REL­
EVANCY AND MATERIALITY OF THE 
"OTHER PURPOSES" EVIDENCE PUR­
SUANT TO RULE 401. 
The next consideration is to determine whether 
the collateral wrongs, crimes, or acts are relevant 
pursuant to Rule 401 of the North Carolina Rules 
of Evidence. Although evidence of a collateral 
event may fall within one or more of the other 
purposes listed in Rule 404(b), eviden ce of the 
collateral event is not admissible unless the offer of 
proof is logically relevant as defined in Rule 401 
of the Rules of Evidence: 
Relevant Evidence" means evidence having 
any tendency to make the existence of any 
fact that is of consequence to the determina­
tion of the action more probable or less 
probable than it would be without the evi­
dence. [emphasis added] 
This definition embraces two important 
evidentiary concepts—relevancy and materiality. 
Tosatisfy the two-fold requirements of Rule 401, an 
offer of proof made pursuant to Rule 404(b) must 
first have a tendency to prove either a listed or 
unlisted purpose pursuant to Rule 404(b) and sec­
ond, the purpose must fall within the range of 
allowableproof as determinedby theclaims, charges 
or defenses raised in the particular case. In toe v. 
Rowland, the North Caro lina Court of Appeals 
stated: 
Before extrinsic conduct evidence is admis­
sible pursuant to Rule 404(b), the trial court 
is required to first determine whether con-
ductisbeingcfferedpursuanttoRule404(b); 
second, the trial court is required to make a 
determination of the evidence's relevancy. 
Statev.Rowland,366SE2d550,556(1988). 
The North Caroli na Supreme Court has de­
scribed logical relevancy as "the touchstone" in 
deciding whether extrinsic evidence is admissible 
under Rule 404(b). State v. Fowler, 230 N.C. 470, 
53 S.E.2d 853 (1949). The court has also stated that 
the "acid test" fa determining whether evidence of 
collateral events falls with in Rule 404(b) is "its 
logical relevancy to the particular purpose fa which 
it is sought to be introduced." State v. Jeter, 326 
N.C. 457,389 S.E.2d 805 (1990). 
McCormick On Evidence points out that the "other 
puiposes" which the extrinsic evidence purports to 
prove must be in controversy: 
15 
[TJhe connection between the evidence and 
the permissible purpose should be clear, and 
the issue on which the other crimes evidence 
is said to bear should be the subject of a 
genuine controversy. For example, if the 
prosecution maintains that the other crime 
reveals defendant's guilty state of mind, then 
his intent must be disputed. Thus, if the 
defendant does not deny that the acts were 
deliberate, then the prosecution may not 
introduce the evidence merely to show that 
the acts were not accidental. Likewise, if the 
accused does not deny performing the acts 
charged, the exceptions pertaining to identi­
fication are unavailing. McCormick On 
Evidence, 4th Ed. pages 346-347. 
Also, in determining the probative value of an 
extrinsic act, the remoteness in time of the prior 
event diminishes its probati ve value. The North 
Carolina supreme court has held that evidence of 
similar prior sexual assaults by the defendant which 
happenkl seven years before the sexual assault in 
question was prejudicial to defendant's fundamen­
tal right to a fair trial because the prior acts were too 
remote in time. [State v. Jones, 322 N.C. 585,369 
S.E.2d822 (1988)]. Rule4Q2 of the North Carolina 
Rules of Evidence pro vides in pertinent part th at 
"relevant evidence is admissible" unless excluded 
by some other rule of law and that "[ejvidence that 
is not relevant is not admissible." 
3. DETERMINE IF THE "OTHER PUR­
POSES" EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO 
PROVETHATTHEDEFENDANTCOMMIT-
TED THE COLLATERAL ACT. 
The third step in analyzing the admissibility of 
other wrongs, crimes or acts evidence, is to deter­
mine whether the evidence is sufficient to prove that 
the parly (usually the defendant in a criminal case) 
actually committed the collateral act In 1988, the 
United States Supreme Court addressed this burden 
of production issue in Huddleston v. United States, 
485 U.S. 681, 108 S. a 1496, 99 L.Ed.2d 771 
(1988). The Supreme Court held: 
We conclude that a preliminary finding by 
the court that the Government has proved 
the act by a preponderance of the evidence is 
not called for under Rule 104(a)... In the 
Rule 404(b) context, similar act evidence is 
relevant if the jury can reasonably conclude 
that the act occurred and that the defendant 
was the actor. (Huddleston, 108 S.Ct. 1496, 
1501). 
Therefore, the Court in Huddleston proceeded to 
adopt the conditional relevancy standard provided 
in Rule 104(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence: 
In determining whether the Government has 
introduced sufficient evidence to meet Rule 
(Continued on page 16) 
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104(b), the trial court neither weighs 
credibility nor makes a finding that the 
Government has proved the conditional fact 
by a preponderance of the evidence. The 
court simply examines all the evidence in the 
case and decides whether the jury could 
reasonably find the conditionalfact ...by 
a preponderance of the evidence. ... Often 
the trial court may decide to allow the pro­
ponent to introduce evidence concerning a 
similar act , and at a late r point in the trial 
assess whether sufficient evidence has been 
offered to permit thejury to make the requi­
site finding. (Huddleston, 108 S.Ct 1496, 
1501). 
Although the Huddleston standard has become 
known as the "sufficiency of evidence" standard, a 
careful readin g of the case reveals that the Co urt 
actually adop ted the Rule 104( b) conditional rel­
evance standard: 
When the relevancy of evidence depends 
upon the•fuffillmentqfa condition of fact, the 
court shall admit it upon, or subject to, the 
introduction of evidence sufficient to sup-
portafindingofthefuffillmentofthecondition. 
Now the North Caroli na Supreme Court has 
purportedly adopted the Huddlest on burden of 
production standard. In State v. Stager, pa Justice 
Mitchell stated: 
In Huddleston, the Supreme Court of the 
United States held that evidence may be 
admitted under Rule 404(b) of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence if there is sufficient evi­
dence to support a jury finding that the 
defendant committed the similar act; no 
preliminaryfinding by the trial court that the 
defendant actuetily committed such an act is 
required. Huddleston, 485 US. at 687-88 
108S.Ct. at 1500-01,99LEd2dat 781. We 
find the reasoning of Huddleston compel­
ling and conclude that evidence is admissible 
under Rule 404(b) of the North Carolina 
Rules ofEvidence f it is substantial evidence 
tending to support a reasonable finding by 
the jury that the defendant committed a 
similar act or crime and its probative value 
is not limited solely to tending to establish the 
defendanf s propensity to commit a crime 
such as the crime charged. State v. Stager, 
329 N.C. 278,406 SE2d 876,890 (1991)'. 
It is interesting to note that even though the North 
Carolina Supreme Court has ostensibly adopted the 
Huddleston standard, the court neithe r discusses 
nor invokes the termino logy of conditional rel­
evancy in conjunction with its analysis of Rule 
404(b) offers of proof. Instead, theCourthascoined 
its own phrase, "substantial evidence", as the stan­
dard to be applied in determining whether the 
proponent of "other purposes" evidence has pro­
duced enough evidence to connect the defendant to 
the collateral event It should also be noted that 
North Carolina Rule 104(b), the con ditional rel­
evancy rule, is identical to its federal counterpart It 
appears, though, that contr ary to the rationale of 
Huddleston, the "substantial evidence" standard 
adopted by the North Ca rolina Supreme Court in 
Stager, Agee and Scott is treated as a part of a 
preliminary question analysis pursuan t to Rule 
101(a), raiher than as a question of conditional 
relevancy pursuant to Rule 101(b). These tworules 
operate quite differently. The trial judge determines 
the prelimin ary question of admissibility under 
Rule 104(a). "In making its determination, [the trial 
court] is not bound by the rules of evidence except 
those with respect to privilege." [Rule 104(a)], 
Conditional relevancy (101b), on the other hand, 
authorizes the trial court to admit, to the jury, 
evidence of the collatera l act, before evidence is 
offered establish ing the fact that the defendant 
actually committed the collateral acL If the p ropo­
nent does not offer "sufficient evidence" to prove 
that the defendant committed the collateral act, thai 
according to the language of Rule 101(b), the 
conditionhas not been fulfilled and the judgeshould 
withdraw evidence of the coll ateral fact from the 
jury. The burden is on the opponoit, however, to 
makeamotiontostrikeevidoiceof the collateral act 
if theproponent does not offer"sufficient evidence" 
to fulfill the condition 
To summarize, a collateral wrong, crime or act is 
admissible under Rule404(b) of the North Carolina 
Rules of Evidence if the proponent of the evidence 
is able to produce "substantial evidence tending to 
support a reasonable finding by the jury that the 
defendant committed a .similar actor crime." (p. 890 
of Stager). The substantial evidence standard is a 
relatively low threshold requirement It is a much 
Iowa buitien of proof standard than the burden of 
persuasion standard applied in c riminal trials (be-
yond areasonabledoubt). The"suhstantialevidcixe" 
standard merely requires that the proponent of the 
collateral wrong, crime or act produce enough 
credible and competent eviden ce connecting the 
defendant to the collateral event that the j ury's 
decision on this issue would not be overturned. 
Although the term "substantial evidence" gives the 
impression that an enormous amount of evidence is 
required to link the defendant to the collateral event, 
in reality the standard is a low quantum of proof 
requirement that demands only the production of 
"some evidence" connecting the defendant to the 
commission of the collateral event. 
4. DETERMINE WHETHER THE ADMIS-
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SIONOFTHE PRIOR OFFENSEWOULD BE 
BARRED BY THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY 
CLAUSE OR BY THE DOCTRINE OF COL 
LATERAL ESTOPPEL. 
The next step is to analyze the issues of collateral 
estoppel and double jeopardy wh en the collateral 
crime offered into evidence at the present trial has 
been the subject of a previous adjudicatioa 
A difficult issue arises when the prosecutor in the 
present criminal trial offers evidence of a collateral 
crime for which the defendant was previously 
acquitted or which resulted in a mistrial. The 
Double Jeopardy clause of the Constitution and the 
principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel 
normally preclude the re-litigation of the issue of 
guilt once a final judgment on a case or issue has 
been entered. The preclusive effect of prior adjudi­
cations on the admission of "other purposes" 
evidence has been the subject of numerous appel­
late decisions in both the federal court s and the 
courts of North Carolina. 
Dowling v. United States, 110 S.Ct. 668 (1990), 
is a landmark decision of the United States Supreme 
Court that addressed the admissibility of collateral 
offenses against a defendant even though the defen­
dant has beenpreviously acquitted of thoseoffenses. 
The Court in Dowling first discussed an earlier 
Suprone Court decision: 
In Ashe v. Swenson, 397 US. 90 S.Ct. 
1189,25 LEd.2d469 (1970), we recognized 
that the Double Jeopardy Clause incorpo­
rates the doctrine of collateral estoppel. In 
thatcase.agroupofmaskedmenhadrobbed 
six men playing poker in the basement of a 
home. The State unsuccessfully prosecuted 
Ashe for robbing one of the men. Sa weeks 
later, however, the defendant was convicted 
for the robbery of one of the other players. 
Applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel 
which we found implicit in the Double Jeop­
ardy Clause, we reversed Ashe's conviction, 
holding that his acquittal in the first trial 
precluded the State from charging him for 
the second offense. We defined the collateral 
estoppel doctrine as providing that "when 
an issue of ultimate fact has once been 
determined by a valid and final judgment, 
that issue cannot again be litigated between 
the same parties in any future lawsuit." 
Ashe's acquittal in the first trial foreclosed 
the second trial because, in the circum­
stances of that case, the acquittal verdict 
could only have meant that the jury was 
unable to conclude beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant was one of the 
bandits. A second prosecution was imper­
missible because, to have convicted the 
(Continued on page 17) 
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defendant in the second trial, die second jury 
had to have reached a directly contrary 
conclusion. Dowling v. United States, 110 
S.Ct. 668,671-72 (1990). 
The facts in Dowling were that the defendant was 
charged with armed robbery while wearing a mask. 
As proof of his identity, the prosecution offered into 
evidence the testim ony of a witness that she had 
been robbed in her hone by a masked robber 
several weeks before the armed robbery in ques-
lioa She testified that defendant was the person 
who had robbed her. The defendant, however, had 
been previously acquitted of committing the p rior 
robbery of the female witness. In the Dowling 
decision, the Court distinguished the facts in 
Dowling Iran the facts in Ashe v. Swenson: 
... [Ujnlike the situation in Ashe v. Swenson, 
the prior acquittal did not determine an 
ultimate issue in the present case... andwe 
decline to extend Ashe v. Swenson and the 
collateral estoppel component of the Double 
Jeopardy Clause to exclude in all circum­
stances ... relevant and probative evidence 
that is otherwise admissible under the Rules 
of Evidence simply because it relates to 
alleged criminal conduct for which a defen­
dant has been acquitted. [Dowlingv.United 
States, 110 S.Ct. 668(1990)]. 
Therefore, the critical test under Dowling is 
whether the prior acquittal determined an ultimate 
issue in the present case. If so, then evidence of the 
prior offense would be excluded. If not, then 
evidence of the prior offense would not be pre­
cluded by the Double Jeopardy Clause or by the 
doctrine of collateral estoppel even though the 
defendant was acquitted of committing the alleged 
prior offense. 
The North Carolina Supreme Court was con­
fronted with this same issue in State v. Agee, 391 
S.E.2d 171 (1990). The North Carolina Supreme 
Court held, pa Justice Whichard, that in defendant's 
criminal tria l for felonious possession of LSD, it 
was not reversible error for the trial court to admit 
evidence of defendant's possession of marijuana to 
show a chain of circumstances related to die LSD 
possession charge despite the fact that the defendant 
had been previously acquitted of the possession of 
marijuana charge. According to Justice Whichard, 
ihe previous acquitta l on the marijuana charge 
would not be precluded because "the prior acquittal 
did not determine an ultimate issue in the present 
case." [YlLolState v. Agee, citing Ashe v. Swenson, 
397 U.S. 436 (1970) and Dowling v. United States, 
493 U.S. 342 (1990)]. 
The North Carolina Supreme Court reconsidered 
this issue mState v. Scott, 413 S.E.2d787 (1992). In 
Scott, the defendant was tried on several charges 
including rape, kidnapping and crime a gainst na­
ture. At the trial, the prosec ution introduced the 
testimony of a witness (not the prosecuting witness) 
that two years earlia, the defendant had raped her 
unda circumstances similar to the alleged rape for 
which the defendant was then on trial. T hedefen-
danihad been tried and acquitted of the alleged prior 
rape. In a carefully written opinion, Chief Justice 
Exum, speaking for the majority of the court stated: 
We conclude that evidence that defendant 
committed a prior alleged offense for which 
he has been tried and acquitted may not be 
admitted in a subsequent trial for a different 
offense when its probative value depends, as 
it did here, upon the proposition that the 
defendant in fact committed the prior crime. 
To admit such evidence violates, as a mater 
oflaw,EvidenceRule403. Statev. Scott,•413 
SE.2d 787 (1992). 
The Court concluded: 
The North Carolina Rules of Evidence must 
be interpreted and applied in light of this 
proposition: anacquittalandtheundefeated 
presumption of innocence it signifies mean 
that, in law, defendant did not commit the 
crime charged. When the probative value of 
evidence of this other conduct depends upon 
the proposition that defendant committed 
the prior crime, his earlier acquittal of that 
crime so erodes the probative value of the 
evidence that its potential for prejudice, 
which is great, must perforce outweigh its 
probative value under Rule 403. State v. 
Scott, 413 SE2d 787 (1992). 
The court reversed the kidnapping and rape con­
victions but upheld the crime against nature 
conviction. The court's rationale was that evidence 
of the prior sexual offense (fa which the defaidani 
had been acquitted) pertained to the issue of consent 
in the case sub judice. Cons ent is not a defense to 
acrime against nature chargeand the impermissible 
admission of the pria ofense evidence did not taint 
the aime against nature conviction 
The court's decision in Scott would appear to be 
in conflict with its decision in Agee, even though the 
court attempted to distinguish the two cases on both 
the facts and the law. In a dissenting opinion to the 
majority opinion in Scott, Justice Meya points out 
that the majority opinion appears to be a departure 
from the co urt's traditional a nalysis of co llateral 
estoppel andofthcbalancingtest found in Rule403. 
(1) It is clear that if the pr ia adjudicatiai deter­
mined an "ultimate issue in the present case", as in 
Ashe v. Swenson, then evidence of the pria offense 
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that resulted in an acqui ttal would be b arred. (2) 
Also, if the prior adjuciadon did not determine an 
"ultimate issue in the present case", then the prior 
adjudication would be admissible in the subsequent 
case, unless the court determines, as InState v. Scott, 
that it would be unfair purs uant to a Rule 403 
analysis to admit evidence of the pria offense that 
resulted in the acquittaL Scott thus create s an 
important exception to case s such as Dowli ng v. 
United States and State v. Agee. 
5. DETERMINE WHETHER THE PROBA-
TIVEVALUE OFTHE "OTHER PURPOSES" 
EVIDENCE IS SUBSTANTIALLY OUT­
WEIGHED BY UNFAIR PREJUDICE 
PURSUANT TO RULE 403. 
The Rule 403 test is refe rred to as the "legal 
relevancy test and should be distinguished from the 
"logical relevancy" test stated in Rule 401. Rule 
403 provides as follows: 
Although relevant, evidence may be ex­
cluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair preju­
dice, confusion of the issues, or misleading 
thejury, or by considerations ofundue delay, 
waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence, [emphasis added] 
The inherent nature of "other purposes" evidence 
creates the danger that the introduction of collateral 
wrongs, crimes or acts of a defendant in a criminal 
case might lead the jury to reach a ve rdict on an 
impropa basis; the jury may intentionally or unwit­
tingly conclude that since the defendant committed 
otha crimes, he probably committed the crime in 
questioa Once the jury is made aware of collateral 
events, it is difficult to control the manner in which 
the jury will consider and weigh this evidence. For 
this reason, 404(b) evidence should not be intro­
duced unless it is clear that the prejudicial effect of 
the "otha purposes" evidence would not substan­
tially outweigh its probative value. 
In orda to avoid the prejudicial effects that might 
result if the jury hears testimony conconing a 
collateral act , it is recommended that co unsel for 
defendant in a criminal case consida taking the 
following steps: 
1. Request through discovery a copy of the 
Defendant's prior criminal record from the pros­
ecution and (though not listed in the discovery 
statute) any additional information of prior 
wrongs a acts that the prosecutor plans to 
introduce. 
2. File a pre-trial motion in limine to exclude the 
introduction of collataal wrongs, oimes and 
acts. 
3. Make specific objections based on Rules 401, 
403 and 404(b) to the ruli ng of the tri al court 
admitting collateral wrongs, crimes and acts. 
(Continued on page 18) 
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4. Make a motion to strike evidence of the 
collateral wrongs, crimes a- acts if there is not 
"substantial evidence" to connect the defendant 
to the collateral act 
5. Make a motion for a limiting instruction and 
provide to the court a proposed limiting instruc-
tioa 
6. Submit to the court a memorandum of law or 
trial brief in support of the exclusion of 404(b) 
evidence. 
7. Providecopies of relevant favorabledecisions 
to the court (e.g. State v. Scott). 
8. Make a motion for a mistrial (if appropriate). 
9. Make a motion fa- a new trial (if appropriate). 
10. Lay the groundwork for an ap peal and be 
prepared to appeal 
6. APPLY THE DOCTRINE OF LIMITED 
ADMISSIBILITY PURSUANT TO RULE 105. 
The final step in determining the admissibility of 
"other purposes" evidence arises from the applica­
tion of thedoctrineof limited admissibility found in 
Rule 105 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence. 
The rule provides as follows: 
When evidence which is admissible as to 
one party or for one purpose but not admis­
sible as to another party or for another 
purpose is admitted, the court, upon request. 
shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope 
and instruct the jury accordingly. 
The Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 105 of 
the North Carolina Rules of Evidence states in 
pertinent part: 
A cbse relationship exists between this rule 
and Rule403which requires exclusionwhen 
"probativevalue is substantially outweighed 
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion 
of the issues, or misleading the jury." The 
present rule recognizes the practice of ad­
mitting evidence for a limited purpose and 
instructing the jury accordingly. The avail­
ability and effectiveness of this practice must 
be taken into consideration in reaching a 
decision whether to excludefor unfair preju­
dice under Rule 403. 
Evidence which is admitte d pursuant to Rule 
404(b) may be considered by the jury only to the 
extent that i t proves one or more of the "other 
purposes" to which it was admitted. "Other pur­
poses" evidence may not be considered by the jury 
as proof that the defendant may have acted at the 
time in question in a manner cons istent with her 
character, because as stated earlier, the propensity 
rule [Rule 404(a)] excludes the introduction of 
circumstantial character evidence Normally, the 
judge restricts tie jury's consideration of evidence 
of other crimes, wrongs, or acts by giving a limiting 
instruction to the jury. T he essence of the limiting 
instruction is that the jury may consider evidence of 
other crimes, wrongs, or acts of the defendant only 
for purposes of determining whether the prosecu­
tion has established proof of specific "oth er 
purposes" pursuant to Rule 404(b). 
In State v. Stager, (the murder case in which the 
defendant-wfe was found guilty of killing her sec­
ond husband), the trial court did not give a limiting 
instruction to the jury. Presumably, the jury consid­
ered the evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts for 
any and all purposes. Despite the failure of the trial 
court to give a limiting instruction, the North Caro­
lina supreme court held that a limiting instruction is 
not required "unless specifically requested by coun­
sel." [State v. Stager, 401 S.E.2d 876,894 (1991)]. 
The Court's ruling in this regard is consistent with 
Rule 105 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence 
which provides that a limiting instruction shall be 
given "upon request" in an appropria te situation 
The danger exists, however, that in the absence of 
a limiting instruc tion, the ju ry will proba bly con­
sider tlx;"othcrpurposes" evidence ascircmnstantial 
character evidence — a result that would clearly 
contravene the propensity rule. 
CONCLUSION 
An analysis of the "other purposes" clause of 
Rule404(b) would be incomplete without a discus­
sion of the u nderlying rationale of this rule. The 
primary policy justification i n support of Rule 
404(b) is that it pr ovides a means of introduc ing 
relevant evidence that might be otherwise excluded 
by the propensity rule. Some legal commentators 
believe that justice is best served when the jury is 
given all of the relevant facts. The counter-argu­
ment, of cours e, is that Rule 404(b) is merel y a 
subterfuge to the admission of highly prejudicial 
circumstantial character evidence. Rule 404(b) is 
essentially a "prosecutor's rule" that enables a 
prosecutor to present to the jury character evidence 
disguised as "other purposes" evidence. Once the 
jurors have heard "other purposes" evidence, the 
efficacy of limiting instructions is questionable. 
Our role as litigators and as officers of the court is 
to mitigate the potentially prejudicial effect of 
"other purposes" evidence so that justice might 
prevail 
Edited by: WJO 
The Barrister editors would like to thank Profes­
sor Ringer for allowing us to publish this edited 
version of his article. You may wish to read his 
+111,000 word version in a soon to be published 
NCCU Law Journal. 
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PARK IT: UPDATE 
In the last edition of The Barrister it was re­
ported that the availability of studentparking was 
homendously inadequate. (Over 400 day law & 
criminal justice students compete for 45 student 
assigned parking spaces.) Since then, the Univer­
sity has added approximately one hundred and 
forty student piking spaces across from the 
Criminal Justice building - a step in the right 
direction, in addition, the University is looking 
into other potential parking sites and satellite 
parking. Dr. Percy Murray is the chairperson of 
the University Facilitator Planning Committee. 
There is of course, the questions concerning the 
need and statutory requirement of adequate 
handicap parking, as well as the apparent exces­
sive ^'(faculty/staff) designated parking spaces 
surrounding the law schooL these matters should 
be discussed and addressed in the next edition of 
The Barrister. 
By: WJO 
UPDATE: LEGAL 
WRITING IS ILLEGAL 
In the previous The Barrister an article authored 
by David Lambert set forth the facts which clearly 
showed that the majority of Instructors/Professors, 
involved in the most subjective matter cours es -
legal writing courses - were routinely ignoring the 
Law School's own rules. The rule is that ALL 
GRADING IS TO BE ANONYMOUS. The rule 
does not say except for, or jn cases of: or the 
exceptions are. 
Moreover, the law school has at least one writing 
instructor who blatantly refused ANY anonymity 
in grading when she DEMANDED STUDENTS 
NOT USE SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS. 
Students were told to cross out their social security 
numbers and insert their NAMES. 
The Law School Administration was made aware 
of the above through student evaluations as well as 
several "one on ones." 
Since the previous publication the adminstration 
has said and done nothing to correct these prac­
tices. The Barrister will ask the SB A to bring the 
matter before the Faculty during afaculty meeting. 
The Barrister will attempt to meet with Chancellor 
Chambers to ask for his assistance in this matter. 
By: WJO 
PART II: WHAT THE "L" IS GOIN' ON 
Another Opinion: Is Law School Worth It? 
Or, Have I or Am I Making the Biggest Mistake of My Life?! 
This is a continuation of the article pre­
sented in the last edition of The Barris­
ter. We offer it for comic relief 
Professor James Gordon Ill's1 satirical look at 
law school in all of its radiant glory (or is it gory?) 
suggests that one may be far "better off' being a 
spelling coach for D an Quayle or obtaining a 
PhD. (pile it higher a nd deeper) in Quantum 
Melodies of the Spheres, then to consider the 
ludicrous, horrendous, helacious experience of 
law school and the ungodly profession of law. 
vn. THE LAW FACULTY 
The faculty is a distinguished group of prison 
guards who sit in attack formation at law school 
assemblies. If you want to know what kind of 
people law professors are, ask yourself this ques­
tion: "What kind of a person would give up a 
salary of a zillion dollars a year in a big firm to 
drive a rusted-out Ford Pinto and wear suits made 
out of old horse blankets?" Think about this 
carefully before asking your professor's opinion 
on any subject 
Politics are often divisive at law schools. In the 
1960's, the faculties were conservative and the 
students were liberal. In the 1980's, the students 
were conservative and the faculties were liberal. 
The 1970's were a difficult transitional period 
during which, for an awkward moment, faculties 
and students were able to communicate. They 
discovered that they did not like each other. 
When law professors are not doing important 
things like writing commercial outlines, they are 
writing casebooks. Of course, they make you buy 
their casebooks fortheir classes. Justto prove that 
at heart they are really gentle, fun-loving people, 
professors will occasionally do something a little 
bit zany, like wear a costume to class on Hallow­
een. Before you laugh and cheer, you should 
check your calendar. It is o ften difficult to tell 
whether a professor is wearing a costume or not. 
VDL THE SECOND AND THIRD YEARS 
The second and third years are about the same 
as the first year, except that you get to choose your 
teachers (this is called forum shopping) based on 
the difficulty of their grading curve. The profes­
sors describe their courses in a list called, 
appropriately enough, "Course Descriptions." An 
honest list of course descriptions might look 
something like this: 
Civil Procedure. Learn about the paper warsof 
litigation. Discover why, every time a case is 
filed, another forest dies. 
Constitutional Law. Ridicule people who still 
believe that the Framers' intent has any rel­
evance whatsoever. 
Contracts. Study rules based on a model of 
two-fisted negotiators with equal bargaining 
power who dicker freely, voluntarily agree on 
all terms, and reduce their understanding to a 
writing intended to embody their full agre e­
ment. Leam that the last contract fitting this 
model was signed in 1879. 
Criminal Law. Study commonlaw crimes that 
haven't been the law anywhere for more than 
100 years. Then, to bring things up to date, 
study the Model Penal Code, which is not the 
law anywhere today. 
Criminal Procedure. Leam almost enough 
about the rationale behind the exclusionary 
rules to defend yourself at cocktail parties. 
Environmental Law. Discoverwhy,ifyouput 
an empty oil can to your ear, you can hear the 
ocean roar. 
Evidence. Memorize the hearsay rule and its 
50,000 exceptions. Good for people with a 
photographic memory and gangs of free time. 
Income Taxation. Prepare to be a tax lawyer. 
A tax lawyer is a person who is good with 
numbers but who does not have enough per­
sonality to be an accountant 
legal Ethics/Professional Responsibility. 
Leam why "honest lawyer" is an oxymoron. 
Torts. Study a compensation system in which 
the transaction costs generally exceed the pay­
ments to the injured parties. Fortunately, most 
of the transaction costs occur in the form of 
attorney's fees. 
Wills and Estates. Dead people and their 
things. Also known as "Stiffs and their Gifts." 
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR). How 
people resolve disputes without lawyers, be­
cause a simple dogbite case takes five years 
and $50,000 to get to trial. Leam how to 
recognize ADR and squash iL 
IX. COCURRICULAR PROGRAMS AND 
STUDENT ORGANIZATIONS 
Being fully committed to providing the best 
possible educational opportunities for every stu­
dent, law schools offer cocurricular programs, 
like law journals and moot court Then, quite 
naturally, they to hardly anyone participate in 
them. Tie most elitist organization is d ie law 
review, which is generally restricted to the top ten 
percent of the class. These students are given this 
special honor so that employers will not overlook 
them just because they are at the top of their class. 
Law review editors spend their time doing mean­
ingful educational tasks like checking the citation 
form of articles they don't understand. 
Many law schools have also started other law 
journals. These journals usually focus on a spe­
cific area of the law, and have names like The 
Journal of Comparative Funeral La w. They 
concentrate in a particular area so that they don't 
have to be named The Second-String Law Re­
view, which they would consider somewhat 
demeaning. 
There are also student organizations. Some of 
these ostensibly focus on a particular topic or 
interest, like "Future Trial Attorneys for the Clini­
cally Brain Dead." However, they really exist 
only to provide resume padding. A student wants 
to be able to say that he is the Exalted Grand 
Excellent Potentate of the AncientRoyal Order of 
Back Benchers. This is supposed to impress 
employers. 
X. INTERVIEWING FOR JOBS 
Before you interview, you will need to prepare 
a "resume." It is also called a "curriculum vitae," 
a Latin phrase meaning "preposterous fab le." 
Tfiere is a fine art to interpreting resumes. 'Top 
10%" means "top 20%." 'Top 20%" means "top 
half." "Middle of the class" means "bottomhalf." 
Law schools get extremely angry what students 
pad their resumes like this. They give moralistic 
lectures telling students that it is just plain dishon­
est Because they are the nation's leading law 
schools, the twenty-five schools in the Top Ten 
get particularly huffy about it One final sugges­
tion: to avoid unwarranted federal interference, 
take care not to send your resume through the 
mails. 
You should ask how many hours associates are 
required to bill. I n some firms, associates bill as 
many as 3,000 hours a year. Sometimes this is 
accomplished through "triple billing," a tech­
nique by which an associate works on client A's 
matter while flying to a city for client B, and he 
thinks that the issue may possibly somehow 
someday be relevant to client C. So he bills each 
client full bore. It is also accomplished through a 
time warp on the 14th floor, which allows associ­
ates to bill fifteen hours in a ten-hour day. 
(Continued on page 20) 
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(Continued from page 20) 
In any case, associates work very hard. One 
student asked if the associates ever do anything 
fun together. "Sure," the interviewer replied. 
"About two o'clock, we knock off for an hour and 
go play a game of racquetball." The student 
observed, "What a great way to break up the 
afternoon." The interviewer responded, "After­
noon?" 
The definition of a partner is a "self-employed 
slave." Partners spend most of their lives squab­
bling like a pack of hyenas over the firm's profits. 
You should not get discouraged, however. You 
should remember that there are many job oppor­
tunities and lots of different types of work that 
lawyers do. For example: 
Corporate Work: draftingdocumentsforscum-
suckingcorporationsthat poisonhugenumbers 
of innocent people. 
Litigation: defending scumsucking individu­
als who poison afew innocent people at a time, 
mostly because they lack the capital and tech­
nology to poison huge numbers of innocent 
people. 
Public Interest Work: suing scumsucking 
corporations that poison huge numbers of 
innocent people. Lawyers doing this work 
earn less than what the law firms on the other 
side of the litigation pay their pencil sharpen­
ers. 
Weigh your options carefully! 
XL MAKING YOUR GETAWAY 
Before you graduate, you take a test called the 
"Professional Responsibil ity Exam." This test 
asks you questions about ethics and morality. If 
your answers reveal that you have the slightest 
trace of a conscience remaining, you are sched­
uled for surgery. Perhaps you have noticed that 
many young lawyers wear sporty sweatbands on 
their heads when they play racquetball. They do 
this to hide the scar. 
After you have graduated, you have to go 
through an initiation rite called "Preparing for and 
Taking the Bar Exam." The state bar association 
says that bar exams are designed to ensure the 
competency of the practicing bar. You learned 
about them in your antitrust class, under the topic 
of "Market Entry Barriers." They make it pos­
sible for people who are already admitted to the 
bar to make a living wage (ie, about $200,000 a 
year). You will probably feel somewhat better 
about the exam's rationale if you pass it 
You will need to take an intensive, eight-week 
course, costing a trillion dollars, to prepare for the 
bar exam. Wait a minute, you say. Why did I 
borrow ten trillion dollars and spend three years of 
my life going to law school? Didn't law school 
teach me the law? No, you idiot. Law school's 
purpose is not to teach you the law. Law school 
taught you to THINK LIKE A LAWYER, unless 
you attended one of the elite schools, then it taught 
you to think like a medieval philosopher, or a 
business school dropout 
Before you take the bar exam and become a 
"full-fledged"2 lawyer, you must d o ate more 
thing. You need to ask your law school dean to 
write a letter recommending you for admission to 
the bar. The dean's time is very limited, since he 
(or she) teaches a full three hours out of a forty-
hour week. Your dean will probably send a 
recommendation letter that looks like this: 
(SEE LETTER IN ORIGINAL) 
Since your dean took the time from his (a her) 
crushing schedule to write this tetter for you, he 
must not be such a bad person after all. In fact, 
from now on he (or she) will make you one of his 
(or her) personal penpals. Throughout your entire 
mortal existence, no matter where y our career 
takes you, through all the ups and downs of life, 
your dean will regularly write you thoughtful and 
personally computer-generated tetters — asking 
you for money. You just can't put a price on a 
friendship like thaL Lie or she, however, d oes 
have a ballpark figure in mind. 
So now you know all there is to know about law 
school. If you haven't yet decided whether to go 
to law school, you should consider it carefully. If 
you are in law school now, you should also 
consider your options. But if you want my 
objective, even-handed, carefully considered ad­
vice, I'll tell you: 
GET THE HEY OUT OF IT WHILE YOU 
STILL CAN! 
Edited By: WJ.O. 
The Barrister would again like to thank the 
Yale Law Journal for the authorization to 
publish this edited version of Professor 
Gordon's article which appeared in Yale's 
April (Fool's) edition. 
ENDNOTES 
' Gordon, How Nol to Succeed in Law School, 100 Yale 
L J. 1679. 
2 As in "vulture." The principal difference between a 
lawyer and a vulture is that the vulture doesn't take off its 
wingtips. 
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IS JUSTICE TRULY A 
BLIND GODDESS?: 
RACE, DISCRETION, 
AND THE CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM. 
Bias or prejudice is such an elusive condition 
of the mind that it is most difficult, if not 
impossible, to always recognize its exist­
ence.1 
Atop London's "Old Bailey " stands the 
blind goddess of justice.1" Her bandaged eyes 
and beveled scales serve as a testament to the 
ideal that all persons, regardless of race, are 
treated equally before the courts. Beyond 
this idealism, however, lies the naked truth: 
there are marked disparities in criminal sen­
tencing and favorable parole decisions for 
white and African-American criminal defen­
dants. Is justice truly a blind goddess? 
There are two main types of criminal sen­
tencing in theUnited States: Determinateand 
Indeterminate.2 Determinate sentencing is 
based upon a philosophy of deterrence and 
retribution. Parole is unlikely and criminal 
defendants will usually serve out their entire 
term.3 The focus of indeterminate sentencing 
is on rehabilitating the defendanL A judge 
will sentence a defendant to a range of years, 
with the understanding of future release once 
rehabilitation has been shown.4 Sentencing 
in an indeterminate sentencing scheme is 
subject to judicial discretion.5 In most cases 
a judge will rely heavily on facts contained in 
the defendant's pre-sentence report to deter­
mine a sentence.6 The pre-sentence report 
reveals information about the defendants 
crime, past criminal record, education, em­
ployment record, family status and even 
sexual orientation.6* Indeterminate sentences 
are thus deemed to fit each individual defen­
dants needs, and judges are not required to 
state the reasons for a particular sentence.7 
Statistical studies of racial disparities in 
sentencing and parole decisions indicate the 
disparities exists between African-American 
and white criminal defendants in various 
parts of the United States.8 This occurs not 
only in sentencing but in prison populations 
and in the actual amount of time served.8" 
Researchers have devised various explana­
tions for this occurrence. Some suggest that 
minority offenders serve disproportionately 
(Continued on page 21) 
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(Continued from page 21) 
larger prison terms because their cases are 
less often disposed of through plea bargains.9 
Another explanation is the pre-sentence re­
port; researchers have discovered that 
African-American criminal defendants are 
more likely to possess characteristics that 
indicate the potential for recidivism. These 
include chronic unemployment, unstable 
families, and lengthy prior criminal records 
that result in disfavorable treatment.10 Re­
searchers argue that the mere fact a 
disproportionate number of minority cases 
are disposed of more severely than white 
criminal defendants cannot be prima facie 
proof of racial discrimination. Yet, still 
others argue that the system is infested with 
widespread racial discrimination due to the 
gross discretionary decision making ability 
of judges and parole boards.11 
Whatever explanation one chooses to ac­
cept, it is important to note that the federal 
courts have not wholly ignored this problem. 
Congress adopted the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines (FSG) which were put into effect 
in 1988 and 1989.12 These guidelines were a 
response to the inconsistency of sentences 
for similar conduct by similar defendants. 
The FSG were designed to eliminate the 
disparate sentences that were a consequence 
of unfettered discretion of district court 
judges, and replace them with fair and "sci­
entific" determinate sentences devised by an 
independent administrative agency.13 
Before the FSG judges were free to rely 
on individual philosophies of punishment, or 
their view of a particular offender. The 
reasons for a sentence were often poorly 
articulated; there was little or no appellate 
review; and the judges were of a mindset that 
the parole system was the place in which to 
correct errors.14 Opponents to FSG however, 
reason that sentencing has now been reduced 
to a mere computation and discretion has 
moved into the hands of the prosecutor. They 
argue, for example, that it is the prosecutor 
who dictates the quantity of drugs that wil be 
charged to a criminal defendant. The amount 
of drugs charged will determine calculation 
of the FSG "score" which in turn controls the 
overall severity of the sentence.15 
A troubling aspect regarding parole board 
decisions is that they are "closed door" pro­
ceedings. It is extremely difficult for a 
prisoner to gather information tending to 
show discriminatory practices. Moreover, 
even when prisoners are able to gather infor­
mation tending to show racial bias, at least 
one court has found the evidence insuffi­
cient. In Inmates v. Greenholtz,l6the. Eighth 
Circuit held that neither ethnocentric deci­
sion making nor racial slurs uttered during 
parole board deliberations were convincing 
evidence of racial discrimination. 
Even if one concludes that the criminal 
justice system is fraught with discretionary 
abuse, a solution to the problem is largely 
unclear. However, in order to reduce, at the 
very least, the potential for discretionary 
abuse, all states should provide for a strict 
standard of review for all parole board deci­
sions. The cloak and dagger secrecy that 
often shrouds the decision making process 
creates an environment where abuse can 
occur. Some suggest that one way to eradi­
cate discrimination is to shift the burden of 
proof to the parole review board, or institute 
parole release guidelines.17 
In Castaneda v. Partida,l*lht Supreme 
Court devised a burden-shifting test in re­
sponse to claims of racial discrimination in 
grand jury venires. The court held that to 
raise a presumption of intentional discrimi­
nation defendants must meet two 
requirements. First, the defendants must 
show that they are members of a cognizable 
racial group. Second, defendants mustprove 
that the legal procedure employed, unfavor­
ably affected a disproportionately higher 
number of their group's members. Only if 
this two prong test is met does the burden 
shift to the state to show non-discriminatory 
reasons for this occurrence This reasoning is 
sound. At first glance it appears that the 
parole board would be unfairly burdened by 
a presumption of racial discrimination. The 
presumption however, can be rebutted by the 
production of all pertinent criteria that went 
into the decision making process— includ­
ing past criminal conduct and behavior 
patterns. This type of burden will force 
parole boards to be detailed and systematic 
when evaluating each individual prisoner. 
The crux of this issue is nql that discre­
tionary decisions are being made; it is the 
level of discretion officials hold, and the lack 
of an adequate checks and balances system 
once a decision is made. Criminal defen­
dants are not only innocent unless proven 
guilty, they are also entitled to a fair and lucid 
sentence absent bias or prejudice. Whatever 
the truth about racial discrimination within 
the criminal justice system is, it is fair to say 
that discretionary decision making has the 
21 
potential for unfair treatment. Placing limits 
on discretion, or abolishing it entirely would 
be a movement toward insuring equal justice 
for all. 
By: Robert L. Lambright 
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